Merve Özkaya, doctoral student in the Cerdap² laboratory, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA
Diplomatic and cultural relations between France and Turkey are based on a historical legacy that dates back to the days of the Ottoman Empire. Key moments in this relationship include the 16th-century alliance between François I and Suleiman the Magnificent against Charles V, Sultan Abdülaziz's visit to Paris in 1867, and, more concretely, Colbert's creation in 1669 of the "École des jeunes de langues" (later known as "Langues O'", and officially known today as INALCO - Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales) to train Ottoman language interpreters, not to mention the establishment of the Galatasaray Franco-Turkish lycée in Istanbul in 1868. These interactions fostered a cultural rapprochement marked by a strong French influence. By the mid-19th century, French had established itself as the international language of the Ottoman Empire, becoming the lingua franca of the elite and a vehicle for the dissemination of modern ideas, such as the Enlightenment and positivism, which contributed to the modernization of the Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey.
Although French cultural influence has declined since the 1960s in favor of English, the legacy of this period remains visible in Turkish educational institutions. In particular, French schools in Turkey (13 in all, including 8 in Istanbul, 1 in Ankara and 4 in Izmir) and Galatasaray University (a French-speaking Turkish public university founded in 1992, following an agreement signed by Presidents Mitterrand and Özal) play a key role in maintaining Franco-Turkish cultural links and promoting the influence of France in Turkey. In recent years, however, the presence and operation of these establishments have been called into question by the Turkish government, which is now applying the principle of reciprocity in a context of tension between the two countries.
At the heart of the tensions are a series of changes brought about by the law on separatism, passed in France in 2020: the abolition of ELCO (enseignements de langue et de culture d'origine) to be replaced by EILE (enseignements internationaux de langues étrangères), which put an end to the teaching of the culture of origin and made it compulsory for teachers to obtain a B2 level certificate in French; a ban on sending imams "on secondment" from foreign countries and an end to their remuneration by the states in question. These changes considerably weaken the Turkish state's ability to control and mobilize the Turkish diaspora in France. The Turkish government has reacted by relying on the principle of reciprocity, thereby jeopardizing the operation of French and French-speaking schools in Turkey. For example, in 2021, the Turkish government for the first time required French teachers at Galatasaray University to obtain a B2 certificate in Turkish in order to renew their residence and work permits. Recently, new enrolments in the French lycées Charles de Gaulle in Ankara and Pierre Loti in Istanbul (French schools approved by the French Ministry of Education) were prohibited to Turkish and binational students by the Turkish National Education, again on the grounds of reciprocity, as the creation of Turkish schools in France has not been authorized. The eleven other French-language schools in the country, which are Turkish and governed by private law, and not directly supervised by the French Education Ministry, are not yet affected.
In reality, the desire to open Turkish schools in France is part of the Turkish soft power strategy that has been in place for several years. In particular, it involves using education as a lever of influence. With this in mind, this article aims to provide keys to understanding the socio-political motivations and implications of this strategy in the French context. This analysis is based on empirical data from our survey conducted in the Lyon region between 2020 and 2024. It is based on participant observations in Turkish organizations (associations, mosques, etc.) and semi-structured interviews with members of the Turkish community in the Lyon region.
Training future diaspora elites
Since 2016, the Turkish government's initiatives to establish Turkish schools not only in France, but also around the world - notably in Africa - have intensified considerably. These initiatives notably concern the creation of schools affiliated to the Maarif Foundation (Maarif Vakfı in Turkish), the only entity authorized to provide educational services abroad, created on June 17, 2016 by a law enacted by the Turkish parliament. This foundation was created primarily to counter the Gülenist movement by taking over their network of schools, with the aim of restoring Turkey's image and strategy of influence, in line with the official ideology of the Turkish state and through education.
Although there are as yet no Turkish schools in France supervised by the Turkish Ministry of Education, the Maarif Foundation has been active in Strasbourg since 2018 and in Lyon since 2023. There, it runs extracurricular establishments offering tutoring, language courses and more. This mission contributes to Turkish soft power in the host society, complementing other Turkish institutions active in the cultural field, such as the Yunus Emre Institute (a Turkish cultural institute comparable to the French Institute or the Goethe Institute). In addition, the Maarif Foundation offers a variety of activities for young working people and students from the Turkish community, including themed seminars and discussion cafés, providing participants with a new space for socialization in addition to the usual community spaces such as Turkish associations or mosques. This establishment is therefore of vital importance for training the future elites of the Turkish diaspora and for developing new, potentially influential community networks, thus promoting Turkey's influence in its adopted country. This mission of training the elite is all the more important as the number of people from the Turkish diaspora who have completed or are continuing their higher education in France remains very low. For example, according to data provided by the Turkish consulate in Lyon in 2019, around 885 people in the consulate's constituency, which includes a total population of around 145,000 individuals, have undertaken or completed studies at bachelor's, master's or doctorate level. This relatively low figure can be attributed to the fact that young people from Turkish immigrant backgrounds in France generally show little interest in higher education. This situation is both the cause and consequence of the academic failure observed, and unofficially quantified, by the Turkish authorities within this community. Various cultural and socio-economic factors contribute to this phenomenon, creating a vicious circle that is difficult to break.
Turkish families immigrating to France from Anatolia often have a low level of cultural and educational capital. Due to their limited knowledge of the French education system and the language barrier, these families struggle to guide and support their children throughout their schooling. This lack of appropriate educational support contributes significantly to their children's failure at school. At the same time, cultural norms and expectations within the community also play an important role. Traditional matrimonial codes and predominantly community-based socialization favor early and endogamous marriages. This trend leads to a lack of interest in long-term studies, as young people prefer to marry and enter the job market quickly in order to earn money. Professional networks within the Turkish community, particularly in the construction and catering sectors, reinforce this dynamic. These sectors, while requiring few formal qualifications, offer relatively lucrative employment opportunities, making higher education less attractive for many young people, especially boys.
However, it is important to highlight a gender distinction in attitudes towards higher education. Girls are more numerous and more interested in pursuing post-secondary studies than boys among those from Turkey. This may reflect a greater desire for social mobility or less pressure to enter married life at an early age.
As a result, the situation of young people from Turkish immigrant families in France with regard to higher education illustrates a complex process of socio-cultural reproduction. Obstacles to academic success, social norms and limited professional opportunities in low-skilled sectors combine to create a vicious circle that hinders the upward social mobility of this community. This situation is a matter of concern for the Turkish state, which sees a strategic interest in training the community's future elites through education, so that they can use their high social status to best represent Turkey's national interests in their adopted country, particularly on issues such as the Kurdish problem and recognition of the Armenian genocide. The Maarif project is part of this strategy, providing training, guidance and supervision under the strict supervision of the Turkish state. It should also be noted that the Turkish state is not the only player to invest in the education sector in France and, more broadly, in Europe. For example, in 2014, the Islamic community of Milli Görüş in France founded a school that does not have a contract with the French national education system, called La Maison d'Arqam , which includes a nursery school, elementary school, as well as a middle school and high school located in Vénissieux, in the Lyon region. Similarly, the Süleymancı, a Turkish-Islamic group operating under names such as "Centre Culturel Turc de Lyon", attaches significant importance to education, notably through the organization of tutoring courses.
However, despite their Turkish national character, these groups pursue distinct politico-religious agendas that do not necessarily merge with the national agenda of the Turkish state. In this context, the creation of Maarif schools can also be seen as a tool for surveillance and control of the educational field by the Turkish authorities.
This paternalistic approach adopted by the Turkish state towards its nationals abroad is perceived in an ambivalent manner: it is welcomed by part of the Turkish community, while arousing considerable mistrust on the part of the French authorities. This mistrust, manifested in particular by the blocking of requests to open Turkish schools in France, is based on two main concerns that are increasingly raised in both the political and media spheres: "communitarianism" and foreign interference. In fact, the Turkish community in France has a strong "entre-soi" attitude in relation to other exogenous communities. Thus, the possible creation of Turkish schools seems perceived as a risk of reinforcing communitarianism among new generations, distancing them from the French school system in favor of the teaching of a curriculum and a framework for cultural and linguistic transmission under the aegis of the Turkish state. Attempts by Turkey to interfere in France via its diaspora, particularly in the political arena, are also fuelling the mistrust of the French authorities. This mistrust is accentuated by the growing divergence between the two countries' political agendas on the international stage, whether in Greece, Libya, Syria or West Africa.
In conclusion, France's rejection of the creation of Turkish schools under the aegis of the Turkish state seems to be undermining cultural relations that go back centuries, and accentuating tensions between the two nations. Two scenarios can be envisaged in this respect: if the French authorities agree to the opening of Turkish schools on their territory, these establishments could, paradoxically, foster better integration of the younger Franco-Turkish generations into French society via an education carefully controlled by the Turkish state. On the other hand, the use and mobilization of these establishments by the Turkish state as political leverage would be an unknown quantity for France. On the other hand, should Turkey insist on applying the principle of reciprocity against the current unbalanced situation in favor of France, the tug-of-war between the two countries would jeopardize French establishments in Turkey and risk damaging bilateral relations, not only politically and diplomatically, but also culturally.
¹ François Georgeon, "Préface", in Güneş Işıksel and Emmanuel Szurek eds, Turcs et Français : Une histoire culturelle, 1860-1960, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014, p.9.
² Jean Marcou, "Le relations franco-turques, à la recherche d'un nouveau souffle", in Diplomatie (Diplomatie française. Une influence à reconstruire?), n°127, March-June 2024, pp. 60-61.
³ Merve Özkaya, "La stratégie d'influence de la Turquie en Europe à travers sa diaspora", Le blog des enseignantes-chercheures et enseignants-chercheurs de Sciences po Grenoble, April 6, 2024.
⁴ In Strasbourg, the Yunus Emre private school group has been operating since 2015. This establishment is private, with no official link to the Turkish National Education and no contract with the French National Education.
⁵ This constituency covers 3 regions and 16 departments (Ain, Allier, Ardèche, Cantal, Drôme, Isère, Loire, Haute-Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Rhône, Savoie, Haute-Savoie, Côte-d'Or, Jura, Saône-et-Loire, Creuse).
⁶ See for a study demonstrating the educational advantage of girls among descendants of immigrants, including those of Turkish origin, over the course of schooling: Yaël Brinbaum, "Trajectoires scolaires des enfants d'immigrés jusqu'au baccalauréat", in Éducation & formations (La réussite des élèves : contextes familiaux, sociaux et territoriaux), n° 100, 2019, pp. 73 to 104.
⁷ We assume that the house of Arqam takes its name from Arqam, one of the first companions to embrace Islam. During the Meccan period, the Prophet and the Muslims conducted their activities secretly from the house of Arqam for some time, which made his house famous in the history of Islam and it is known today as Dar al-Arqam (the house of Arqam).
⁸ The "Trajectoires et Origines" 1 and 2 surveys, conducted by INSEE and INED ten years apart (in 2008-2009 and 2019-2020), highlighted these characteristics.
⁹ Merve Özkaya, op. cit.
10 Jean Marcou, op. cit. p. 61.
Photo credit: © Merve Özkaya - "Galatasaray University, flagship of Franco-Turkish cultural cooperation, established on the banks of the Bosphorus in Istanbul" - August 2022
Bibliography :
Brinbaum Yaël, "Trajectoires scolaires des enfants d'immigrés jusqu'au baccalauréat", in Éducation & formations (La réussite des élèves : contextes familiaux, sociaux et territoriaux), n° 100, 2019, pp. 73-104. URL https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02426359
Georgeon François, "Préface", in Güneş Işıksel and Emmanuel Szurek eds, Turcs et Français : Une histoire culturelle, 1860-1960, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2014.
Marcou Jean, "Les relations franco-turques, à la recherche d'un nouveau souffle", in Diplomatie (Diplomatie française. Une influence à reconstruire?), n°127, March-June 2024, pp. 60-61.
Marcou Jean, "France-Turquie: une relation ancienne devenue de plus en plus inconstante", Annuaire français des relations internationales, Éditions Panthéon-Assas, volume XXIII 2022, pp. 455-471.
Özkaya Merve, "La stratégie d'influence de la Turquie en Europe à travers sa diaspora", Le blog des enseignantes-chercheures et enseignants-chercheurs de Sciences po Grenoble, April 6, 2024. URL https://www.sciencespo-grenoble.fr/blogs/la-strategie-dinfluence-de-la-turquie-en-europe-travers-sa-diaspora