Merve Özkaya, Doctoral student in political science, Université Grenoble-Alpes

Diaspora communities from Turkey now number almost 5.5 million in Western Europe, including 800,000 in France, according to data from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although all of Turkey's socio-political, ethnic and denominational plurality is represented, the majority of Turkish nationals in Western Europe support Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamo-nationalist government. By way of example, the percentage of votes in favor of Erdoğan in the last Turkish presidential elections in May 2023 was as follows in the European countries with the largest Turkish populations: 67% in Germany, 66% in France, 70% in the Netherlands, 74% in Belgium and 73% in Austria.

The Turkish government, for its part, deploys the means of the state to mobilize this diaspora effectively as a political lever. Turks are increasingly organized around associations in Europe, and particularly in France, thanks to the support of the Turkish state. This involves both financial support and strategic guidance through Turkish public institutions. Indeed, the Turkish community[1] has become one of the pillars of Turkey's strategy of influence in Europe, implemented under the banner of "public diplomacy".

Thus, this article looks at how Turkey's strategy of influence in Europe in Europe, and more specifically in France, as well as the objectives and the objectives and actors of its "public diplomacy". In this article, we will draw on empirical data collected during our collected during our fieldwork in the Lyon region between 2020 and 2023, as well as on the analysis of selected media content.

Public diplomacy" is an ambiguous concept that has been used in diplomacy and political science for several decades, simply to define the conduct of a state's international policies with the aim of indirectly influencing the policies and actions of other states. It relies on public communication and relations with a wide range of non-governmental entities. Depending on the context, it can be as much a means of creating " soft power " as political interference.

Over the past decade, Turkey has adopted a new strategy of influence through its "public diplomacy" aimed at influencing and guiding the international community. The aim is to restore Turkey's legitimacy on issues that have long tarnished its image on the international stage: the Cyprus question, the PKK issue and the question of recognition of the Armenian genocide. Since the suspension of Turkey's membership of the European Union, the Cyprus question has been less in the international spotlight. However, the PKK issue and the Armenian question remain major preoccupations of Turkish "public diplomacy". What's more, in recent years, another issue has been added to these concerns: the fight against Islamophobia. These last three themes are now at the heart of Turkey's policy of influence, particularly in France, given the ethnic and religious structure of its population.

Intervening in multiple fields (religious, educational, humanitarian, cultural and political), the aim is to reconfigure Turkey's image with target audiences likely to influence the policies of the countries concerned, so that it can mobilize them as support for its policies. Public diplomacy" will thus expand its sphere of political influence in line with its own interests on socio-political issues concerning Turkey and its nationals abroad. To this end, Turkey seeks to influence three publics in the countries concerned and stimulate their mutual interaction: the Turkish community, the non-Turkish public (especially Muslims) and local and national political actors. With regard to the actors involved in deploying this strategy of influence, we can identify three distinct and contextually linked categories of actor: local civil actors (Turkish cultural associations, Turkish-European civil society organizations); institutional actors (Turkish consulates, YTB[2], Maarif Education); media actors (TRT Türk, Agence Anadolu, the official Turkish news agency).

The main and oldest associative players from Turkey in Europe are the networks linked to DITIB(Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği i n Turkish, Diyanet). Attached to the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey and representative of official Turkish Islam abroad, DITIB today controls more than a hundred mosques in France. Some of the religious staff at DITIB mosques come directly from Turkey, while others are young binationals who have completed their theology studies in Turkey as part of the UIP[3] program. The religious education provided by this institution depends entirely on the Diyanet: Friday sermons are written every week by the Diyanet in Turkey, the sources used in religious courses (books of hadith, translations of the Koran, sîra, etc.) are almost exclusively published by the Diyanet publishing house, etc. In addition to its religious role, the DITIB also constitutes a centre of excellence for religious education in Turkey. In addition to its religious role, the Diyanet is a privileged space for socialization for Europe's Turkish-Muslim community.

DITIB has been a key player in Turkey's religious diplomacy in recent years. However, it is not really in a position to play an active role in realizing the objectives of current Turkish public diplomacy, in the broadest sense, since its sphere of influence is limited: its religious label does not allow it to intervene in the political sphere, nor to be a unifying player for the Turkish community as a whole. Yet the Turkish state's objective is to rejuvenate Turkish associations and unite them under a single roof, irrespective of politico-religious group, provided they do not represent ideologies "contrary to the interests of Turkey". Moreover, the context of political questioning of Turkey's religious diplomacy, in France and to a lesser extent in Europe, is leading the Turkish state to adopt new organizational strategies outside the religious sphere.

For Turkey's "public diplomacy" has been investing in the younger generation young generations of the Turkish community, educated and qualified in their in their host countries. They are encouraged and supported by public institutions institutions like the YTB, for example, to set up new associations in various such as education, health, law, sport and so on. These These organizations are intended to be both new social spaces for the younger generation, and a vector of influence for Turkey through their Turkey through their activities, which benefit not only the Turkish community but also to the host society. This strategy of influence can be described as a soft power policy, and which the Turkish state through new generation associations, is also undertaken directly by public is also undertaken directly by public organizations such as Maarif Education and the Yunus Emre Institute (a Turkish cultural institute comparable the French Institute or the Goethe Institute), which operate in the field of education and culture.

That having said that, it's important to point out that there's another side to Turkey's "public diplomacy". another facet to Turkey's "public diplomacy", which is more about creating sharp power. In other words, the Turkish state mobilizes local Turkish networks in networks in Europe to gather information on sensitive issues that can be used can be used to strengthen Turkey's position in diplomatic negotiations. in diplomatic negotiations. The following quote, taken from a speech of a YTB diplomatic staff member at an information meeting for young young Franco-Turks at DITIB Lyon in 2021, sums up this aspect of Turkey's public diplomacy. this aspect of Turkey's public diplomacy:

"It's important It's important to inform us of the problems that affect you, even indirectly. We expect you to provide us with objective information on the problems you have problems you have encountered and witnessed (...). Turks and Turkish companies are sometimes the victims of Islamophobic attacks attacks (because of their headscarves, for example) or terrorist attacks, when our military operations are intense against the PKK and its branches in the Southern Marches. It's very important to report such incidents not only to us not only to us, but also to the relevant institutions in France, so that we can so that we can record them. Without this data, without the judicial records, we are diplomatically weak."

Indeed, since 2018, the YTB has been reporting acts of discrimination and rights violations reported by Turkish nationals abroad via the NESAM (fight against hate crimes and discrimination) portal. These incident reports, which contain details of the perpetrator, victim, place, time and reason for the acts, are mainly based on the statement of the persons concerned, with only some corroborated by documents relating to the incident. In the 2022 report, a total of 46 attacks were reported in France, including 17 against Turks. These are grouped according to the motivation of the attacks: 8 racist attacks, 4 Islamophobic attacks and 5 terrorist attacks (PKK/PYD/YPG). The YTB also supports projects run by young people from the Turkish diaspora in their host countries, concerning the "fight against anti-Muslim racism" in Europe. One example is the Advocacy and Research Center ( ADREC) platform currently under development in Germany. This project has received financial support for its realization.

These projects and actions undeniably reveal the paternalistic reflexes of a country wishing to protect the rights and security of its nationals abroad, but it's not entirely out of the question that they have served to discredit and delegitimize the countries concerned on the diplomatic and political stage, through the manipulation of information and intelligence gathered. The opinion of the French SG-CIPDR (General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization) on the official press agency of the Republic of Turkey, Anadolu, points to just such a risk: " Anadolu is a propaganda organ which publishes opinion pieces on its website attacking France in a false and slanderous way. (...) This propaganda organ sets itself up as a critic of France's actions, claiming that the State is targeting its Muslim citizens. This is intolerable.

On the media front, the Turkish public broadcaster TRT has for some years been producing numerous programs aimed at "European Turks", designed to inform them and raise their awareness of socio-political issues. For example, on the TRT Türk channel, a program entitled "Que disent les jeunes?" (What do young people say?) welcomes young "Euro-Turks" from various Western European countries, such as Germany, France and Belgium, to debate various issues relating to Turks in Europe. The program is prepared and presented by Öznur Sirene, known in France for his polemical media organization, Red'action Média and for his pro-Erdoğan political stance. The themes of some episodes of this show are: "Islamophobia, xenophobia: can extremism be prevented in Europe?"; "Do Turks in Europe interact with other Muslim communities?"; "Do young Turks want to play a role in European politics?"; "Is another Europe possible?". In one of the episodes of this program, Öznur Sirene denounces the "hypocrisy" and "disinformation against Turkey" in the European media, particularly in France, and advises her young guests to follow Turkish media outlets such as the TRT channels broadcasting in foreign languages, and the Anadolu agency, precisely to "avoid disinformation".

From these examples, it's easy to see that the role of these media aimed at Turks in Europe goes far beyond informing or raising awareness, and in fact consists of creating public opinion in line with the official ideology of the Turkish state, enabling it to use this as political leverage in European countries. In the medium and long term, this could lead to a political capitalization of the Turkish community in Europe by Turkey. In this respect, it is also worth noting that the participation of bi-national Turks in political life (voting and standing as candidates in elections in their host country) has been openly and intensively encouraged by the Turkish state as well as by civil organizations close to the government (notably UID, Union International Democrats).

Suffice it to say that this policy is gradually bearing fruit, particularly in Germany and France. Finally, despite the shift in Turkish power towards political Islam under Erdoğan, Turkey's strategy of influence in Europe could, paradoxically, presage a latent secularization of Turkish community organizations in favor of their overt politicization. In addition, the electoral defeat of Erdoğan's AKP party on March 31, 2024, in local elections (municipal and departmental) could lead to a political shift in Turkey in the coming years in favor of the country's nationalist, secularist political current. Such a development would undoubtedly call into question this strategy of influence towards the Turkish diaspora.

[1] For the purposes of this article, the term "Turkish community" is used to to refer to people of Turkish origin who support Turkey's current current Turkish government.

[2] Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, in Turkish, Présidence pour les Turcs à l'étranger et les communautés apparentées in French. Established in 2010, it is headquartered in Ankara.

[3] International Theology Program, Uluslarasi Ilahiyat Programi in Turkish.