Arnaud BuchsSenior lecturer in economics at Sciences Po Grenoble and the GAEL laboratory
How would you define objectivity in your discipline?
First of all, raising the question of objectivity in the SHS should not lead us to assume that only the SHS are subject to criticism in terms of objectivity and controversy over the administration of proof. This question is inherent to all scientific activity: the sciences are imperfect and limited bodies of knowledge (by our cognitive capacities, the techniques and knowledge that constitute the "state of the art" and controversies at a given moment, etc.) and one of the motors of evolution is doubt. In this respect, physicist Antoine George believes it is possible to extend to science in general what Socrates said about philosophy as a "school of doubt".
However, one of the particularities of the social sciences and humanities is the difficulty (if not the impossibility) for the researcher (and especially the teacher) to adopt a point of view "from nowhere", in line with what Arendt calls "Archimedean point" thinking. Indeed, the analyst is part of the social world being analyzed, so that " in the social sciences, we are dealing with a complete and complex interaction between observer and observed, between subject and object ".
So, rather than objectivity, I prefer to speak of objectivation, in order to emphasize the idea of process, and therefore of the continuous requirement that must accompany the scientific approach: "Objectivation dominates objectivity; objectivity is only the product of correct objectivation", as Bachelard put it. This continuous requirement implies, at the very least, being aware of the limits of one's own approach - in other words, considering the biases introduced, in particular, by the chosen methodology and the underlying theoretical anchoring - and reporting on them.
Indeed, objectification is a process, and a collective one: " objectivity cannot be detached from the social characteristics of proof. Objectivity can only be achieved by the discursive and detailed exposition of a method of objectification ". To put it more simply, objectivation is based on a collectively constituted "state of the art" that prevails at a given moment, and participates in it by enabling peers to refer to it, support it or refute it. In all cases, this objectification must be "founded on social institutions", foremost among which is peer assessment. For example, in most "peer-reviewed" journals, articles are evaluated on a "double-blind" basis, with authors and reviewers remaining anonymous to each other.
This ongoing, collective need for objectification is all the more important in the social sciences and humanities, as social worlds are characterized first and foremost by their extreme complexity, which is exacerbated by "radical uncertainty" as distinct from probabilizable risk, meaning that the future is not predictable. In other words, as Bergson notes, there is no "cupboard of possibilities": " it is the real that becomes possible, not the possible that becomes real ".
In the final analysis, uncertainty, combined with the biases specific to SHS (relations between subject and object), reinforces the need for continuous and collective objectification. This necessarily implies a reflexive approach to one's own practices, but also to collective research and teaching practices. I believe that this reflexive and transparent approach to the uncertainty inherent in any scientific approach (and which certainly calls for greater humility) is essential if we are to increase public confidence in scientists, and first and foremost in economists, whose credibility is highly questionable if we are to believe Esther Duflo, even though "most of the important issues today are fundamental economic issues" (the challenges of ecological transitions and inequalities, for example).
Is researcher neutrality possible and desirable?
First and foremost, to be involved in research (and teaching) is to be convinced by the idea that to explain is above all to seek to understand, and that the production/dissemination of knowledge and scientific controversy are the best bulwarks against all forms of obscurantism. It means being committed!
The question of neutrality nonetheless raises the issue of research posture, and involves at least two debates. On the one hand, there is positivism "à la Comte", for whom " a science becomes positive only by basing itself exclusively on observed facts ", which translates into the idea that facts are the bearers of their own explanations, and that research thus consists in "revealing" relationships, invariants and even laws; on the other hand, there is constructivism "à la Kant", for whom : "objects are by no means known to us in themselves, and that what we call external objects corresponds to nothing but mere representations" (1787: 45), for which a distinction must be made between the object in itself (the real) and representations described as "phenomena": "it is only the latter that are observed (the real in itself will always remain unknown to us). They are constructions " ... cursed cave!
The second debate concerns what is at stake in the scientific approach: the distinction between a normative approach ("what should be") (for which the question of neutrality does not arise) and a positive approach (explaining "what is"). However, a positive analysis is not the same as a positivist analysis, in the sense that we consider that facts do not provide their own explanation, and that all explanations are theoretical. The criterion becomes one of relevance, i.e. a theory's ability to explain reality. Explanation then requires the specification of "categories" (concepts) and/or the adoption of more or less realistic hypotheses (for example, that it is possible to describe reality by simplifying it, if only momentarily, by virtue of the ceteris paribus / all things being equal clause). These two types of approach are not necessarily mutually exclusive: it is entirely possible to combine them and extend a positive approach with recommendations.
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Like all citizens, academics are " institutionalized minds " - i.e., steeped in multiple personal and professional experiences - with limited rationality (not all information is available, and cognitive capacities to process it are limited). So, even if we seek to "suspend judgment", the fact remains that research practices depend on choices relating to objects (which leads us, for example, to devote our research - and our teaching - to ecological issues), to the formulation of the research question, to methods, to conceptual categories and theoretical frameworks, themselves marked by previous and/or ongoing controversies that contribute to their evolution (even if it means revealing their relative contingency).
Gunnar Myrdal insists on this idea of choice: " Evaluations are always within us. Disinterested research has never existed and can never exist. Before answers, we need questions. There can be no point of view without a point of view. In the questions asked and the point of view chosen, evaluations are implicit. Our evaluations determine our approaches to a problem, the definition of our concepts, the choice of our models, the selection of our observations, the presentation of our conclusions - in fact, the whole pursuit of a study from start to finish. Whether or not we subscribe to this idea, I believe that the requirement is first and foremost one of transparency with regard to the choices made, and therefore puts the question of objectification back at the center.
How important are methods to you as a researcher?
Firstly, I believe that the vitality (and therefore relevance) of a discipline (and of science in general) implies methodological and theoretical pluralism. In this respect, my research employs a variety of methods. Generally speaking, they combine an ecological economics and institutionalist approach with fieldwork (Spain, Morocco, Switzerland, Australia, the Alps), and focus on the analysis of rules and policies governing water resources and their uses.
For example, recent research has taken a positive approach, using quantitative tools (in this case, lexicometrics or textual statistics) to characterize the field of ecological water economics by studying publications on water in five international peer-reviewed journals between 1989 and 2017. This research puts to the test a partition of the field and insists on the contribution of pluralism.
Another positive piece of research involved the use of qualitative methods (in this case, interviews with users and managers of the water resource, as well as work on documentary sources such as planning documents, positions expressed during consultation sessions, archives, etc.). This research mobilized theoretical tools in institutionalist economics to apprehend the pluralism of values. It consisted of a genealogical approach to the water law in the Canton of Fribourg (Switzerland), and aimed to reveal the nature of the compromises that led, over a period of ten years, to the version of the law finally adopted.
It is on this basis, in particular, that we have initiated research with colleagues aimed at proposing a methodological framework to support actors in charge of environmental projects, to enable them to apprehend and specify conflicts likely to emerge between actors, and thus to adapt the participatory processes essential to environmental decision-making. As such, this research is at the crossroads of positive (understanding what is) and normative (supporting change) approaches.
Without falling into the trap of "methodologism" ("chasing a fly with a hammer"), I believe that the quality of a piece of research can be appreciated, in particular, by the extent to which it is methodologically reflexive. My focus on methods is reinforced by my conviction that interdisciplinarity can help us to understand complex subjects, particularly those linked to ecological issues. Indeed, "interdisciplinarity exacerbates the need for a reflexive approach": " upstream, this attention leads to greater transparency in the modes of objectivation of knowledge co-constructed on the basis of plural disciplinary contributions; downstream, it contributes to reinforcing the responsibility of any body or organization called upon to evaluate interdisciplinary research (such as an interdisciplinary journal, for example) vis-à-vis the scientific community and society in general ". In order to go beyond the polysemy of the terms pluri-, inter- and trans-disciplinarity, and to accompany this reflexive effort to objectify, we have, for example, developed with colleagues a tool to qualify " interdisciplinary registers ".
Finally, my attention to methods is also reinforced by my long-standing involvement on the editorial board of the peer-reviewed journal Développement durable et territoiresof which I recently became co-editor-in-chief. The effort made by authors to be objective (and therefore transparent) about the methods and theoretical/conceptual frameworks they use is one of the first criteria used when deciding whether or not to give an article a (double-blind) reading after receiving it. This effort at transparency is symmetrical, and the editorial process is clearly stated by the journal, as recommended in particular by the INSHS of the CNRS.
Could you present an example of research, ideally from your own work, to illustrate the issues and tensions surrounding objectivity and neutrality in SHS?
Collective research is currently underway into the joint management of water resources in the Alps, focusing more specifically on water use within the perimeter of the Vercors High Plateaux nature reserve(COMEWA project : COmmons in Moutains. Enforcing Water security in the Alps, ANR-15-IDEX-02 / Zone Atelier Alpes).
This research questions the ability of joint management - i.e. management methods that are neither centralized coordination (planned or administered management) nor decentralized coordination based on private property rights and the market, as theorized by Elinor Ostrom, winner of the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics - to help renew water governance in mountain areas and make it more sustainable and adaptive in the context of climate change through better coordination of water uses and resources.
It's an exciting project, but one that in part challenges my research habits. It combines, on the one hand, an analysis of coordination methods relating to water use, which has been part of my research since my thesis; and on the other hand, a more unusual aspect, which involves helping stakeholders to modify current management methods, if necessary and in the way they wish. As such, this aspect of the research can be described as action research, and involves the researcher in an entirely different way. Indeed, it's certainly different to analyze a phenomenon a posteriori, cold, than it is to talk directly with the players involved!
However, this involvement is not without methodological precautions, whether in the data collection and processing phase or in the support phase itself, and relies on the methodological resources - and above all the skills of colleagues involved in the project - relating to environmental decision support, deliberative methods, etc. Here too, objectivity is essential! Here again, objectivizing the process is essential!