On Friday April 4, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA hosted a half-day seminar on Syria and its new political and territorial dynamics since the fall of Bashar Al-Assad on December 8, 2024. Students from the Master's program Integration and Mutations in the Mediterranean and Middle East (MMO), along with five of their professors, were at the heart of the day's proceedings. The speakers gave fascinating explanations on a variety of subjects, bringing their own specializations to their arguments.
The new geopolitics of Syria - Jean Marcou
Turkey, on its southern border, is affected by the Syrian crisis: it is the host country for almost four million Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war, some of whom have been planning to return since December 8, 2024. This date marks a spectacular reversal, twelve days of "magnificent revolution" according to Erdoğan, profoundly transforming the geopolitics of the region. Following this upheaval from the Turkish news, we understand that Bashar Al-Assad's regime was weak, despite its image as the victor of the civil war. Both the rebels and the Turks saw this vulnerability as a real window of opportunity. Applying history to this sequence, this geopolitical turnaround can be explained in four phases, according to Jean Marcou. The first is the Cold War and its legacy, when Syria built regional alliances to consolidate its own interests and claims. When Hafez Al-Assad came to power, Syrian-Soviet relations intensified, as did Syrian-Iranian relations following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Then, in the 1980s, Damascus intervened in the Lebanese civil war, as part of the consolidation of a firm front against the normalization of relations with Israel. As for Turkey, bilateral Syrian-Turkish relations were complex, fuelled in particular by the problem of the Kurdish PKK.
Then came another phase in the post-bipolar period, synonymous with hopes of opening up to broader international alliances. It is true that the consequences of the collapse of the USSR had a significant impact on the Baathist state. However, the succession of Bashar Al-Assad to power launched a new opening-up of the country: under Chirac, for example, Franco-Syrian relations were solidified. Syrian-Turkish relations also improved significantly, with Turkey promoting its "zero problems with our neighbors" policy. Regular strategic cooperation is consolidating, testifying to an alliance that is bearing fruit. However, the uprisings of 2011 transformed these ties, with a collapse in Syrian-Turkish convergence. This echoes the third phase in Marcou's explanation of the fall of the Assad dynasty, the geopolitics of civil war. The summer of 2011 marked the break with Ankara, as well as with other Western and Arab alliances. It was Russia that re-established ties with Damascus in 2013, supporting Bashar Al-Assad diplomatically, financially and militarily. According to Jean Marcou, the Russian intervention saved Syria in a way, accompanied by support from Iran and Hezbollah. From 2018 onwards, new diplomatic normalizations led by Al-Assad spread the idea that the Baathist regime had emerged victorious from the civil war. This situation of trivialization of authoritarian power was disrupted by the HTS offensive in December 2024, the subject of the last phase of analysis. Geopolitical realities led to a further decline in support for Syria (war in Ukraine for Russia, events of October 7 2023 for Iran and Hezbollah), making the Syrian leader and his regime vulnerable. These weakening of alliances providing protection have enabled Turkey to present itself from a position of strength: support for rebels in the Idlib enclave and for the Syrian National Army, resulting in a new Turkish foreign policy forging links with non-state actors in border areas. Thus, HTS-Turkey relations were built during the civil war, explaining Turkish diplomacy with regard to the new Syrian regime. Saudi Arabia is also an important player in this Syrian turnaround: Ahmed Al-Charaa is in Riyadh for his first diplomatic trip. Jean Marcou invites us to follow the European Union's position vis-à-vis this new Syrian regime, given the gradual lifting of sanctions against Syria under Bashar Al-Assad. France, for example, has not closed the door on the new Syrian leader, but remains on its guard. And what about the United States and the uncertain future of the Kurds of Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan? The fact remains that we are witnessing the advent of a Turkish-Israeli rivalry in Syria, with the country becoming a theater of misunderstanding between Ankara and Tel Aviv. With multiple external presences involved in Syria, its new geopolitics will depend on the evolution of the country's internal situation.
Syrian society and minorities - Imad Khillo
La société syrienne comporte une multitude de minorités, dont Imad Khillo a fait le choix d’en présenter trois : les Alaouites, les Chrétiens et les Druzes. Toutefois, il semble d’abord essentiel de saisir comment la question des minorités est au cœur des stratégies autoritaires des régimes Al-Assad, en se concentrant sur trois grandes caractéristiques du régime baathiste. En premier lieu, les régimes Assad se distinguent par leur répression, et l’encadrement de la vie politique à travers le monopole du parti Baas. Ceci est accompagné d’un climat de terreur assuré par un appareil sécuritaire redoutable, contrôlant les citoyens et les hiérarchisant. Puis, la dernière caractéristique est la privatisation familiale, qui renforce les inégalités et concentre l’économie dans les mains de la famille Assad. À son arrivée au pouvoir, Bachar Al-Assad intensifie ce système, spécialement en 2001 avec la création de l’Organisation du Développement de la Syrie, créée par la femme du dirigeant syrien, Asma Al-Assad. Cette ONG absorbe l’ensemble de l’aide humanitaire en Syrie et est devenue un véritable outil de contrôle de la famille Assad.
En tout état de cause, l’arrivée au pouvoir de Hafez Al-Assad avec son “mouvement de redressement” a rendu la question des identités centrale : il impose l’identité nationale à dominante militaire et arabiste. Selon Imad Khillo, les dirigeants baathistes ont manipulé les identités confessionnelles syriennes. Il l’explique à travers la présentation de trois minorités. Premièrement, les Alaouites. C’est un courant de l’islam chiite né au IVe siècle en Irak. Les notions fondamentales de ce groupe religieux sont : la réincarnation, l’âme passe d’un corps à l’autre (métempsychose) ; le fait qu’un sens caché du Coran existerait ; l’interprétation spécifique des obligations religieuses ; il n’y a pas de prosélytisme, être alaouite est héréditaire. Cette doctrine se développe au Xe siècle en Syrie, en passant par les montagnes alaouites, où les croyants s’attribuent ce nom. Historiquement, cette minorité religieuse est une des plus persécutées pendant la période ottomane, des fatwas existaient la condamnant. Un débat sur leur nature musulmane a longtemps eu lieu, jusqu’en 1936, lorsque le mufti Al-Azhar a émis une fatwa reconnaissant les Alaouites comme des musulmans, à condition qu’ils acceptent et croient aux cinq piliers de l’islam. Une fois à la tête de la Syrie, Hafez Al-Assad a déclaré l’islam comme religion d’État, et, appartenant à la minorité alaouite, a fait en sorte de protéger cette minorité, et de l’intégrer au système politique : dans son administration, au sein de l’armée, et dans les renseignements généraux. Ceci est motivé par une logique de revanche historique, Al-Assad diffuse un narratif de survie, clamant que sa minorité doit faire partie du système syrien, au risque d’un génocide. Son fils, Bachar Al-Assad a conservé cette stratégie, et l’intensifie en 2011 : les Alaouites sont mobilisés massivement dans l’armée régulière et les milices pro-régime. L’image de dictature alaouite est renforcée. Aujourd’hui, les Alaouites représentent 10 à 12 % de la population syrienne, un nombre minoritaire, mais toutefois plus important que la part des Chrétiens et Druzes dans le pays, explorés par la suite. De plus, les Chrétiens en Syrie ont un rôle historique, ils ont une présence très ancienne dans le pays, avec l’Église d’Antioche, mais ne représentent que 2 % de la population après 2011. Hafez Al-Assad, durant ses mandats, leur a donné quelques postes clés, mais minoritaires. Bachar Al-Assad a fait de même, et s’est présenté comme protecteur des minorités religieuses face aux groupes djihadistes radicaux, notamment à Daech. Il a donc réussi à polariser les Chrétiens de Syrie sur le conflit qu’il contrôlait, en jouant avec les figures chrétiennes. Enfin, les Druzes correspondent à environ 3% de la population. C’est une minorité religieuse qui émerge au XIe siècle, sous le règne du calife fatimide en Égypte. Les druzes se caractérisent par : la réincarnation spirituelle de Dieu dans des figures importantes ; la non-croyance en le paradis et l’enfer ; un sens caché au Coran ; un rejet des rites islamiques traditionnels ; pas de prosélytisme. Cette minorité a également fait l’objet de débats sur leur nature musulmane, ils ont longtemps été considérés comme hérétiques. Ils sont cependant perçus comme musulmans, notamment car leur héritage historique joue en leur faveur en Syrie, depuis la grande révolte dirigée par les Druzes contre la présence française en 1925. Cette minorité religieuse possède plusieurs instances en Syrie, ainsi qu’une autorité suprême religieuse. Sous Hafez Al-Assad, des accords d’autonomie administrative sont établis, acceptant la préservation de leur identité druze. En tout état de cause, depuis la chute du régime syrien, on observe un retour fort des identités religieuses. La déclaration constitutionnelle du 13 mars 2025 entend que l’islam doit être la source principale de législation. Les articles III et V assurent la protection de toutes les communautés présentes sur le sol syrien, en termes de statut personnel, de liberté de conscience et de liberté confessionnelle. Cet éclairage sur la société syrienne et ses minorités par Imad Khillo offre des clés de compréhension de la mosaïque du pays, et de leur rôle tant instrumentalisé par les anciens régimes dictatoriaux des Assad, que pris en compte par le nouveau régime d’Ahmad Al-Charaa. Il reste important de suivre l’évolution de la question des minorités sous ce nouveau régime : vont-elles être véritablement toutes respectées et représentées ?
Syria's post-Assad religio-political landscape: dynamics, fragmentation, reorganization - Zakaria Taha
Understanding the politico-religious landscape of post-Assad Syria requires a long-term analysis, which Zakaria Taha proposes in his talk. Firstly, he points out that Hafez el-Assad's and then his son's relations with Syrian communities and religions were strongly shaped by their membership of the Alawite minority, which was inseparable from the Baath party they represented. On the one hand, Assad-father, as the first head of state who was not part of the Sunni majority, tended to conceal his community affiliation by reappropriating a Sunni religious symbolism. On the other hand, Z. Taha emphasizes Bashar's desire to associate the Alawite minority completely with the regime, as a means of protection in times of crisis. But successive regimes are both marked by a vertical relationship with the communities, with the Alawites in the upper echelons. The fall of the Assad-son regime saw this dynamic totally reconfigured: in a context where a somewhat disorganized space for freedom opened up, we witnessed the entry into politics of certain religious figures and the emergence of new debates on the place of religion in Syria. The Alawites, accused of being associated with the old power, seem divided in their relationship with the new regime, which is calling for a general amnesty. In a declaration dated December 9, 2024, a group of Alawite dignitaries affirmed their willingness to break all ties - real or imagined - with the Assads, and Muhyiddin al-Salloum, head of the Alawite Islamic Council in Homs, later adopted a provision rejecting sectarian discourse. At the same time, Z. Taha insists on a government-led reorganization of the Sunni religious landscape. On March 28, 2025, a Supreme Council of Fatwa was created, whose composition seemed particularly heterogeneous, since only 4 of its members came directly from HTS. Witness to this desire to give prominence to the religious as an interlocutor, the Council brings together Sufis and Druze opposed to HTS as well as supporters of the current regime. And Z. Taha points out that divergences are emerging within the communities themselves, which were previously suppressed by the Baathist regime, but which seem to have been rekindled by the political space that has opened up since December. This talk sheds light on the new dynamics and transformations taking place in the inseparable political and confessional spaces of post-Assad Syria. While the al-Charaa regime seems to be promoting dialogue and making room for its critics, it seems difficult today to predict where it will go in terms of sectarianism.
Syrian territory as a power issue? What's happening on the Syrian-Lebanese and Syrian-Israeli borders? - Daniel Meier
In his talk, Daniel Meier analyses power issues in Syria through the prism of borders. Here, he considers the border as a process, with a territorial (bordering), political (ordering) and identity (othering) dimension. Within this framework, the connection between territory, sovereignty and identity is articulated over a variety of times, and with change: borders pre-exist us and will survive us. Applied to the Syrian case, the literature of "border studies" allows us to speak of processes of de-bordering and re-bordering underway on its territory. Syria's historical ties with Lebanon bear witness to this: D. Meier refers to the Mandate period as the crystallization of the tension between Arab nationalism and Lebanese nationalism, later expressed in more economic terms, with Syria's command economy versus Lebanon's unbridled capitalism. Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976, to regain control over a creeping revolution, was the first step towards the gradual satellisation of the country by Assad's Syria, enshrined in the 1990 Taif Accords. Despite Damascus's forced military withdrawal, Lebanon came back under its influence through a closer alliance with Hezbollah, the armed wing of Iran, the Syrian Baathist regime's greatest regional ally. The fall of the Iranian imperium over Lebanon following the Israeli-led war of 2024 set in motion the dynamics of the Baathist regime's collapse. Since its fall, Syrian-Lebanese relations have undergone transformations, and the border between the two countries is relevant to understanding them, due to its porosity and the exchanges that take place there. The discovery by the new Syrian regime of Lebanese clans that had set up trafficking networks led to a number of reactions: the al-Sharaa army directed its efforts at areas described as pro-Hezbollah, and the Lebanese army intervened, firing on the Syrian army for the first time in the history of Syrian-Lebanese relations. We are thus witnessing what D. Meier describes as a re-bordering process, during which the relationship between the two countries will be less asymmetrical, and will escape the Hezbollah-linked clans that have dominated until now. The Syrian-Israeli border is also indicative of the power reconfigurations underway since the fall of the Assad regime. For 50 years, Syria was a convenient neighbor for Israel: the Hebrew state was able to annex and colonize the Golan Heights without the rare attempts at reconquest failing. Today, Israel is showing unbridled violence in the face of the HTS's worrying power grab. Troops occupy a demilitarized zone on the Golan overlooking Damascus. This provides them with a strategic foothold and a means of exerting pressure, enabling the Israeli army to say that "they did not authorize the deployment of the Syrian army south of Damascus". Within Syrian territory itself, Israel wants to impose itself, undertaking a strategy of cronyism with the Druze to satellite this community and gain the upper hand over the Syrian regime. The border as a process, and approached through the Syrian-Lebanese and Syrian-Israeli examples, thus enables us to grasp certain dimensions of the power stakes underway since the overthrow of the Assad regime - and even before. Borders pre-exist us and will survive us: the territorial, sovereign and identity dimensions of contemporary Syria are, and will continue to be, in flux.
Syria between American Trumpism and European tropism - Jamil Sayah
In this latest intervention, Jamil Sayah looks at the issues at stake in post-Assad Syria through the prism of the contradictory foreign policies of two world powers: Donald Trump's United States and the European Union. Since the new US president came to power, Europeans have struggled to determine a clear position. J. Sayah concludes that they have been defeated: firstly, militarily, because the member countries are divided and have no army. Secondly, on the diplomatic front, because Europe has been excluded from global conflict resolution processes. And economically, and ultimately axiologically - insofar as Europe seems to refuse to admit its weakness and continues to defend its narrative. It therefore seems necessary to break out of a certain form of Eurocentrism and reconsider the EU's overall philosophy. Otherwise, it will find it difficult to counter the Hegelian approach of the USA, which envisages the construction of a new world order through violence and brutality. For J. Sayah, this major shift introduces a new paradigm. Sayah a new paradigm, which is reflected in the "international management of the current Syrian question". For Syria, D. Trump believes in violence and a quick decision to stabilize the situation. His priority is to protect Israel, which is likely to have an impact on US policy towards Syria. With this in mind, Trump is counting on Saudi Arabia's role as a guarantor of stability - and as a country drawing closer to Israel. D. Trump's pragmatism and rationality raise questions about the Europeans' means of action: what do they want? what can they do? Faced with their apparent defeat, they need to regain space in the Middle East, while ensuring Israel's security. In this context, the situation seems out of step with Syrian expectations. All the more so as France, for its part, pursues a confused diplomatic policy, mixing rapprochement with Lebanon and support for Israel, which adds further confusion to the Union's foreign policy. J. Sayah thus concludes that the EU is structurally defeated, lacking both an army and a clear diplomatic objective. It would seem, therefore, that it will not be easy for the EU to have any influence on current international issues, and to adopt a clear policy on post-Assad Syria, in the face of an unbridled US strategy.
CONCLUSION
Concluded by Habiba Fayed and Omar Shaheen, this half-day study session on post-Assad Syria provided a crossroads for understanding the profound transformations at work in the country since December 2024. The various presentations highlighted the scale of the geopolitical shift triggered by the fall of the regime, the emergence of new balances of power, and the major internal issues now facing the country.
At international level, the analyses showed how the weakening of the Syrian regime's traditional supporters, combined with a strategic window of opportunity, favored the rise to power of Hayat Tahrir al-Cham. Turkey, in particular, appears to be a central player in this recomposition, diso but in a position of strength in the face of a Syria in the throes of territorial and political redefinition. At the same time, the Syrian-Lebanese and Syrian-Israeli borders illustrate how power dynamics are being replayed at the country's margins, in a regional context under tension. Internally, the contributions on minorities and religious recompositions have enabled us to better grasp the legacy of the Baathist regime, marked by the instrumentalization of identities and authoritarian centralization. The current transition is accompanied by a reorganization of the religious field, a repositioning of communities, and an open debate on the place of Islam and other faiths in the new regime. The question of forgiveness, raised in conclusion by the students, raises profound questions about the country's ability to overcome its historical fractures.
As a result, this half-day event not only enriched our understanding of contemporary Syria, but also opened up wider avenues of reflection on the issues of political transition, diversity management and sovereignty on a regional scale. It was a particularly rich and instructive exchange, in keeping with the complexity of the Syrian situation.
Cover photo: ©AFP