Daniel Meier, Director of the "Integration and Change in the Mediterranean and the Middle East" program, Researcher at the Cerdap2 Laboratory, Junior Professor Chair - GMO Borders - Sciences Po Grenoble - UGA
 

On November 28 and 29, 2025, three half-day study sessions were held at Sciences Po Grenoble, led by Daniel Meier and Jamil Sayah. The aim was to initiate a collective and interactive reflection based on the dismay felt in the face of the outbreak of violence that has engulfed the region, particularly since October 7, 2023 (Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Syria), by asking how to characterize the regional political order that is taking shape amid the rubble. 

Three follow-up questions opened each of the three half-days. 

• What do contemporary wars represent? 
• How are religious identities being reshaped in such a context? 

• What uncertainties and political (dis)order do these transitions generate at the societal level? 

   

  The following sections of the report are the result of a synthesis carried out by students enrolled in the MMO program.

Far from being a simple "return" to war, the first half-day of study invited participants to understand conflict in the Middle East as a structural dynamic, shaping political orders, forms of sovereignty, and contemporary regional reconfigurations in a lasting way.

Using the case of Lebanon, Myriam Catusse, Director of Research at the CNRS and Director of the IRMC-Tunis, highlighted the ongoing nature of war in Education national political order. Rather than being a cyclical episode, conflict constitutes a lasting matrix of Lebanese institutions. Contrary to the European model, in which war contributed to state consolidation, Lebanon is characterized by a structurally fragile state, embedded in a confessional system historically marked by political violence and external interventions. The sequence that began in October 2023 is part of this continuity, revealing a "cold civil war" marked by the absence of transitional justice, reconstruction largely delegated to private actors, and the state's persistent inability to guarantee protection and public services. In this context, the focus on disarming Hezbollah tends to obscure a deeper crisis of state sovereignty.

The analysis of the Yemeni conflict subsequently proposed by Laurent Bonnefoy, a researcher at CERI/Sciences Po Paris, calls for a shift in the interpretative framework. Far from being limited to a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the conflict is part of long-standing internal dynamics shaped by a conflictual reunification, significant territorial fragmentation, and the gradual marginalization of the Zaidi elites. The rise of the Houthi movement is thus as much a matter of social and identity issues as it is of regional concerns. The current military stalemate, often interpreted as a sign of de-escalation, is in fact the institutionalization of a lasting state of war, based on unstable balances and a particularly high humanitarian cost.

Following on from these analyses, Riccardo Bocco, Professor Emeritus of Political Sociology at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, questioned the scope of the Trump Plan, presented as a peace plan when it is more akin to a unilateral approach lacking any solid legal basis. Developed without consulting the Palestinians and in a context of asymmetrical power relations, this plan breaks with the principles of international law and marginalizes the United Nations in favor of so-called "pragmatic" diplomacy. The vague nature of its provisions, the lack of guarantees regarding the reconstruction of Gaza, and the conditionality of Palestinian sovereignty on the disarmament of Hamas reinforce the idea of a peace conceived without fully recognized partners or guaranteed rights.

The discussions revealed a common diagnosis: the war in the Middle East tends to impose itself as a structuring horizon for political action. Far from being limited to its destructive effects, it contributes to the long-term organization of territories, the fragmentation of sovereignties, and the redefinition of institutional and identity frameworks. In this context, the question of the state remains central—a state that is invoked and expected, but structurally impeded. These analyses thus invite us to renew our understanding of the Middle East by emphasizing the long-term political effects of war, its narratives, and its institutions, beyond the mere sequences of armed violence.
(Imane Lakdim, Anissa Hassen, Lucie Balmana, Léna Carpentier)

The second half of the day focused on the role of religion in these reconfigurations, with two presentations and a round table discussion. During his presentation, Guillaume Roux, FNSP researcher in political science at the UMR Pacte laboratory (CNRS, Sciences Po Grenoble, Université Grenoble Alpes), proposed a theoretical framework for thinking about ethno-racial divisions. He began by emphasizing that the social sciences focus less on fixed "identities" than on processes of identification, which are always situational and relational. After defining and distinguishing between ethnicity and race, he drew on the work of Barth, Brubaker, and Lamont to highlight the process of frontierization: the boundaries between "us" and "them" are fluid, negotiated, and always linked to social interactions and asymmetries.  For the researcher, these boundaries allow for a certain amount of leeway, as individuals have several identity resources at their disposal, which they mobilize differently depending on the context. Roux also emphasized the reactive nature of many minority identities, constructed in response to external assignments, echoing the analyses of the sociology of race. Finally, he demonstrated the central role of the state and police practices in the production of these boundaries: experiences of control, surveillance, and suspicion can crystallize specific identifications and reinforce lines of division. Ultimately, his presentation sheds light on how ethno-racial divisions are constructed and mobilized in situations of conflict.

The second presentation, by Patrick Haenni, associate researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, focused on "The transformation of radicalism in Syria after the fall of Bashar al-Assad." Drawing on his years of field research, he showed how Ahmed Al-Charaa, a former Al-Qaeda leader and head of HTS, became a key political player after the rapid collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime, revealing a radicalism that is now less ideological and more rooted in the country's social and identity dynamics. In a fragmented regional context, where states and powers react solely according to their own interests, the UN is keeping a low profile while unexpected actors, such as Saudi Arabia, are supporting the new regime. Haenni also highlights an internal restructuring of radicalism, now linked to community revenge and local solidarity rather than global jihadism. He concludes by raising the question of a confiscated "revolution": while the established order has indeed been overturned, the initial spirit of the Syrian uprising, peaceful and inclusive, has been largely hijacked by the dominant armed forces.

Finally, during the roundtable discussion led by Daniel Meier on the topic of "Trump's plan and the American vision for the Middle East," Riccardo Bocco, professor emeritus at IHEID, emphasized that Trump's plan, though imperfect, could have unexpected repercussions on the region by strengthening Saudi Arabia's role, consolidating Israel's victim narrative, and reactivating reflection on alternative political models, such as a binational or federal state. Myriam Catusse, director of the IRMC and researcher at the CNRS, highlights the possible ramifications in Lebanon, where the weakened state is becoming a passive actor, and points out that political and community identities are often reshaped in contexts of violence in a region marked by its Ottoman heritage. Laurent Bonnefoy, researcher at CERI, emphasizes Trump's lack of strategic coherence and a regional context dominated by local empowerment, the rise of non-state actors, and the persistence of the symbolic centrality of the state despite its decline. Patrick Haenni, associate researcher at the European University Institute in Florence, analyzes the evolution of the American presence in Syria: far from withdrawing, the United States is reestablishing itself there on a long-term basis, managing Kurdish-Turkish tensions, reinvesting in diplomatic issues, and allowing "gray areas" to develop as a result of the fragmentation and privatization of public services. Finally, Rosita Di Peri, professor of political science at the University of Turin, points out that Trump's plan imposes a colonial order from above, marginalizes the Palestinian question, and is accompanied by a decline in regional resistance, even as the Lebanese crisis and Western power relations reduce the possibilities for protest. Together, these contributions show that Trump's plan, rather than being an operational framework, acts as a catalyst for profound changes in the Middle East.
(Nina Faucherre, Apolline Lebret, Sarah Martin)

The third half-day focused on the transitions and uncertainties inherent in these changes, with two presentations on Lebanon and Iraq followed by a roundtable discussion on the "breakdown" of the current Middle East.

Rosita Di Peri, Professor of Political Science at the University of Turin, analyzed the post-war situation in Lebanon through the concept of "polycrise" and the emergence of neoliberal sectarianism. The political-economic system is dominated by a "consortium" of small groups of businessmen controlling key sectors of the country, which has led to increasing privatization of public services and an explosion of debt. She also highlighted the gradual marginalization of the Lebanese left after the civil war and the Taif Agreement, which consolidated rather than dismantled the confessional system. Hezbollah then filled an ideological void, while integrating itself into a confessional system that it had previously challenged. The debate focused on several points: the ambiguous role of the diaspora in maintaining the status quo; Hezbollah's real capacity to take power; survival strategies in the face of the polycrisis, marked in particular by the mass emigration of young people; and the left's responsibility for its own marginalization and the strengthening of community dynamics.

On Iraq, Adel Bakawan, political scientist and director of EISMENA, presented recent developments in Iraq as an ongoing process of state disintegration, structuring his analysis around three key dates: 2003, 2019, and 2023. According to him, the fall of Saddam Hussein not only overthrew a dictatorship, but also destroyed the state apparatus, with the exclusion of millions of Iraqis and the dissolution of the army, giving way to an Iranian-backed "militia order." He sees 2019 as a turning point, marked by an unprecedented protest movement led by young Shiites who were violently repressed, as well as by the breakdown of the Iranian-American partnership and the escalation of violence between militias, culminating in the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. Now, the center of conflict lies within each community space. During the discussion, he analyzed the role of October 7 in the fall of Bashar al-Assad, acknowledged that young people remain the only protest force, albeit undermined by the regime, and insisted on the need to rethink the nation-state model imposed in 1921.

Finally, the round table, chaired by Jamil Sayah, examined the possibilities for rebuilding a Middle East in the throes of fragmentation. Speakers highlighted the return of the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has profoundly upset the balance established by the Abraham Accords and the 2023 Riyadh-Tehran agreement. They identified new major players (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) and other secondary players (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt), while noting the continuing role of Iran. Turkey's regional influence was discussed in light of its diplomatic successes and internal weaknesses. Participants shared the view that it is becoming necessary to understand the region through interconnected spaces (Arab, Kurdish, Persian, Israeli, Turkish), and no longer solely through the state framework. Particular attention was paid to the ongoing transition in Saudi Arabia and the risks of territorial breakdown in Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria. Finally, several speakers emphasized the need for the region to reconnect with an anti-colonial discourse in order to regain a more assertive position on the international stage.
(Ysé Thénard, Etienne Le Fur, Clémentine Froidure, Maya Carquex).

At the end of these three half-days, two students presented a summary that was praised by participants, both students and professors, for its quality. Here it is:

“A new order in the Middle East?” This is the question we collectively pondered during these three half-days. Although we addressed a wide variety of topics, situations, and countries, a few common ideas emerged from these discussions.
We began by questioning the “return of war,” the title of the first half-day. In reality, Myriam Catusse enlightened us on the fact that war was not really returning, but that we were in a state of permanent war in Lebanon. Laurent Bonnefoy made the same observation for Yemen. Wars in the region are never-ending, and the categories of peace and war are now blurred.

This context of permanent war is rooted in two key processes that have also been mentioned many times:
The first is the fragmentation of territories, with the proliferation of zones of influence and the empowerment of certain territories. The history of Yemen itself is fragmented: its unification dates back only to 1990 and was achieved through a form of domination of the South by the North, with protests that have not ceased and have not even been overshadowed by the anti-Houthi mobilization.
Closely linked to this phenomenon of fragmentation is the collapse of states in the region, in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.  This state weakness can provide a window of opportunity for the opposition, as was the case with the rapid rise to power of HTS in Syria, which can be explained by the collapse of Syrian institutions. However, as Patrick Haenni explained, this regional context of state collapse leaves little hope for stabilization of the situation in Syria.

Another important idea that emerged from these two days is the mobilization of identity in this region. Guillaume Roux spoke to us about the repertoires of identities available to individuals and how state action influences the identification process. This can largely be put into perspective with Patrick Haenni's analysis of what he calls "identity overheating" in Syria. The rise in identity tensions in Syria is the result of many years of violence perpetrated by Bashar al-Assad's regime. This is also the case in Lebanon, where the consortium at the head of the state is responsible for the rise of neoliberal sectarianism, as Rosita di Peri explained to us. This sectarianism emphasizes a type of community identity and crushes other types of social identities that left-wing parties were able to promote before the civil war. In Iraq, Adel Bakawan points out that community assignment is so integrated into the political system that it is no longer at the center of conflict. Tensions have shifted within each community.

We must also highlight the return of overt American interventionism in the region, as an attempt at "pax Americana": There is, of course, the Trump plan, whose limitations have been widely discussed, particularly by Riccardo Bocco, but also the resumption of diplomatic ties with Syria and the removal of Ahmed el Charaa from the list of terrorists.

More than a new order in the Middle East, we are seeing multiple regional reconfigurations:
With the end of the polarization resulting from the Arab Spring between an axis that supports the revolutions and an axis that opposes them;
With the proliferation of buffer zones imposed by Israel to secure its borders;
With "peace processes" that do not include the actors concerned, as in Lebanon and Palestine;
With weakened states that no longer control their entire national territories, leaving room for the empowerment of more and more regions. This leads us to question the very definition of a strong nation-state, which seems to be the exception rather than the rule in the region and remains a model imported, even imposed, by the West.

(Laure Crétinon and Sarah Poujol)