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Ukraine: what if Russia loses the war?

At a glance

Date

May 03, 2022

Theme

European Studies

Jean Marcou, Professor of Law at Sciences Po Grenoble, researcher at CERDAP2 and associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul.

As it enters its third month in recent days third month, the war in Ukraine has also reached a new stage. On April 28, Joe Biden asked Congress for a substantial budget boost of $33 billion to increase military deliveries to Ukraine. military equipment to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky not only welcomed not only welcomed this initiative, but called on Congress to endorse it quickly. The size of the sum and the eagerness of the American to get it adopted clearly shows that the United States no longer no longer intends simply to enable Ukraine to contain the Russian invasion, but now wants to help it counter-attack to put an end to it. it.

In fact, in the space of a few weeks, what started out as benevolent American aid to a seemingly doomed state has turned into increasingly dense support for a country that has proved its ability to resist. In the coming weeks, this may lead to support for a controversial offensive aimed at rolling back Russia, or even defeating it. How did such a turnaround come about, and what are the prospects for a conflict whose scope and strategic significance are profoundly changing?

The Ramstein turning point

It was at the American base in Ramstein, Germany, that the turning point was made official. On April 26, some forty countries gathered there at Washington's initiative. Bringing together most members of NATO and the EU, but also a number of other nearby states (Australia, South Korea, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Morocco, Tunisia...), this totally unprecedented conclave, henceforth to be held on a monthly basis, had as its primary objective to take stock of two months of conflict and assess Ukraine's related needs. Two days earlier, the Secretary of State (Antony Blinken) and the Secretary of Defense (Lloyd Austin) had visited Kiev, and this trip seems to have reinforced their conviction that Ukraine can now win this war.

This observation dominated the discussions at the Ramstein meeting, and inspired the decisions to be taken to implement offensive support for Kiev from now on. Master of ceremonies, Lloyd Austin explained that the countries supporting Ukraine must not only increase their aid, but speed it up. In fact, a veritable air bridge of permanent deliveries to Kiev is being set up, and it's clear that Ukraine's allies are going on the offensive.

This posture is reflected in a change in relations and tone towards Moscow. Just a month ago, Joe Biden's comments describing Vladimir Putin as a "war criminal" and then as "a leader who could not remain in power" were almost perceived as a slip-up by the White House occupant, who is notorious for his gaffes. It is true that the macabre discoveries that followed the release of Boutcha and Irpin have since reinforced these statements, damaging the image of the Russian leader.

But apart from the humanitarian abuses, Russia is increasingly being portrayed as a strategic adversary by the US administration. At the end of his stay in Kiev, and before the Ramstein meeting, Lloyd Austin significantly declared : "We want to see Russia weakened to the point where it is no longer in a position to act, as it did when it invaded Ukraine". Meanwhile, before Congress, Antony Blinken expressed the hope that the invasion would become "a strategic failure" for Moscow.

The lessons from the first two months of the war

In fact, it seems that the United States has already learned the lessons of the first two months of the war, which saw Russia rapidly bog down in its offensives, fail in its attempt to take Kiev and overthrow the Ukrainian regime, and finally reduce its military pretensions to an offensive concentrated on Dombass and south-eastern Ukraine, with the hope of being able to celebrate a Pirrhus-style victory at a now uncertain date.

The massive use of ageing armour, forced to use roads to avoid getting bogged down in the thawing ground at the end of winter, came up against the deployment of new, effective and mobile devices ( Javelin missiles, combat drones, notably the Bayraktar TB2), the steamroller technique of razing cities to the ground to discourage urban guerrilla warfare met with the resilience of well-trained forces, backed up by popular resistance and quick to disperse or regroup, but always holding their ground. The first totally unexpected lesson of these two months of conflict is therefore that Russia does not seem in a position to win the war it has itself started.

From then on, the meaning of this conflict takes on a whole new significance. When the invasion of Ukraine began, the Kremlin seemed to be in an unassailable position of strength. Its army would make mincemeat of its adversary, and the West could only endure, at best licking the wounds of a doomed Ukraine, essentially because it was unwilling and unable to go to war directly against Russia. As has often been the case in the past, Vladimir Putin was in control of time, and in a position to implement an unstoppable scenario.

Photo by Yuliia Tretynychenko on Unsplash

Ukrainian resistance opened the first breach in this order. The intensity of Western economic sanctions and the substantial military aid that immediately accompanied them raised the prospect of a longer conflict, in which economic warfare might eventually bring Moscow to its senses. But the surprising setback suffered by the Russian army, which is becoming more obvious by the day, is changing the situation. After the flagship cruiser Moskva, the Russian fleet lost another two Raptor-class ships on May 2, destroyed near Serpent Island by Turkish-made Baraytar TB2 drones. Where Russia thought it had won, it has revealed its weaknesses, offering those who did not want to wage war the opportunity to do so by proxy, by giving Ukraine the military means to finish off its invader.

The of an unexpected military situation

However, this new scenario is not a foregone conclusion, and its realization depends on a number of factors. The first is logistical and material. It is not certain that the West will have the necessary stocks within the new offensive deadlines they have set themselves, or that they will be able to act "at the speed of war", as Lloyd Austin advocated in Ramstein. To provide immediate support to the Ukraine, France, for example, is going to take twelve trucks equipped with an artillery system (CAESAR), out of the 77 it currently possesses. The Netherlands will do the same, delivering some of the Panzerhaubitze 2000 (a German-made self-propelled armoured gun) it has just acquired.

The United States plans to provide Ukraine with a stockpile of this type of weapon, greater than that possessed by the best-equipped European countries. Germany, for its part, which was reluctant to arm Ukraine before the start of the war, and which had nonetheless dragged its feet until now, has changed its approach since Ramstein, and now plans to supply the Ukrainians with Flakpanzer Gepard (or Cheetah in English), an anti-aircraft armored vehicle of German-Hellenic manufacture.

Other deliveries of more sophisticated equipment are envisaged: anti-tank missiles, combat drones, helicopters... The American aid currently being deployed is the largest since that granted to the Israeli army in 1973, in response to the Egyptian offensive of Yom Kippur. However, some technical equipment requires training for the personnel who will be called upon to use it. This is why Eastern European countries still in possession of Russian equipment are sending it to the Ukrainians, who are usually very familiar with it. In fact, the United States has suggested to the Turks that they hand over to the Ukraine the famous Russian S-400 air defense missiles, the acquisition of which caused controversy within NATO.

The second issue is military. It is whether Russia, in check and this time forced to retreat, will not be tempted tempted to take the plunge, using prohibited weapons (chemical weapons or even tactical tactical nuclear weapons) to try and re-establish a compromised situation. Some evidence has already been found of the Russian army's use of cluster bombs a weapon also prohibited by international conventions. But the use of tactical nuclear weapons in particular would constitute crossing a red line, and Russia could be the first to pay the price. If this If this new stage is not reached, and even more so if the conflict drags on drags on, it is likely that the hypothesis of negotiations and mediation will be revived.

This is the third issue, a diplomatic one. Ukrainian successes and the new American objective of weakening Moscow to weaken Moscow may well raise the bar for future talks, especially if especially if Russia loses ground in the meantime. Since the beginning of since the beginning of April, Russia has suffered attacks on its own territory. two Ukrainian helicopters hit a fuel depot. But NATO NATO countries could also decide to send a fleet to the Black Sea, which would put Turkey (guardian of the straits) in an awkward position vis-à-vis Moscow. position vis-à-vis Moscow. In any case, will Russia be able to resolve to get out of the conflict the conflict without having achieved anything, or even accepting the loss of territories conquered territories?

There's one final challenge that goes beyond European continent. Speaking before Congress on April 26, Antony Blinken not only that Russia must no longer be allowed to do what it did in Ukraine, he said in Ukraine, he said that this conflict should teach a "powerful lesson to anyone who might consider going down that road. to follow that path. Understandably, this message was addressed to China, tempted to invade Taiwan, the big issue for the Americans, who at a time when they seem to be seem to be reinvesting massively in Europe, may only have the Pacific and the Pacific and the other side of the world...