Franck PetitevilleProfessor of Political Science at Sciences Po Grenoble and at the Pacte laboratory
Wars are periods of history. The state that launches the offensive benefits from this this compression of time, allowing it to temporarily determine the the international agenda. Putin has been playing this role for the past month by two terrible "strategic surprises". The first was was to suggest that his troops massed on the Ukrainian border this winter were to embroil NATO in an exercise in coercive diplomacy, while he while he put the finishing touches to his plan to invade Ukraine.
The second surprise was the unexpected brutality of the Russian army. Those who had hoped that the the "carpet bombing" method, tried out by the Russian and Syrian air forces in Aleppo at the end of 2016, would be avoided in a "brotherly country", had to of the similarity of the attack methods. In retrospect, this is not surprising, since 90% of Russian pilots have been mobilized on missions in Syria. In fact, in a month of devastating Ukrainian cities, the Russian military authorities have shown no inclination to respect this fundamental fundamental principle of the Geneva Conventions (1949), namely discrimination between military targets and civilian populations. Even if the Russian army were to use use chemical weapons, it would be yet another war crime, but not so surprising surprising when you remember that Putin has "covered up" for Bashar-Al-Assad with four Russian vetoes at the UN Security Council to block block investigations into the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2017-18.
Crucially, however, the Russian army's lightning victory did not come. Time is now slowing down. Unless one imagines the worst-case scenario (an attack on a NATO member state or the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, which would be catastrophic, including for Russia), Putin has exhausted his element of surprise. The West can now deny him control over time. In the short term, they can continue to equip the Ukrainians militarily. They must also extend their humanitarian aid to Ukraine's borders, and prepare to welcome a great many more refugees from besieged cities transformed into street-fighting zones.
In the medium term, the West can tighten the stranglehold of economic sanctions. These are already well underway, but it would be possible to attack European imports of Russian gas, oil and coal more drastically. Many economists have demonstrated the feasibility of diversifying Europe's energy supplies over the next two years. The European Commission is advocating this. As European states are very unevenly dependent on Russian supplies, it is undoubtedly necessary to continue moving towards a common EU front, but each government wishing to move faster should be able to grant itself this possibility unilaterally. France, which is far less dependent on Russian supplies than Germany and other European countries, could set an example.
In the longer term, maintaining a minimal diplomatic channel with Putin is justified by the objective of securing a way out of the conflict, with a view to restoring Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and financing its reconstruction. On the other hand, a return to " business as usual" diplomacy with Putin is probably no longer possible. Such diplomatic normalization would not be compatible with the International Criminal Court launching an investigation into war crimes committed by the Russian army in Ukraine. Moreover, on two occasions in the space of a month, almost 3/4 of the 193 member states of the UN General Assembly have condemned the aggression against Ukraine, with Moscow supported only by a quarter of the world's worst dictatorships (Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Syria)[1].
This diplomatic isolation of Putin's regime must undoubtedly be maintained. It is inconceivable that Putin will attend the G20 summit in Indonesia in November. However many years he has left at the head of Russia, a diplomatic cordon sanitaire will certainly have to be maintained around him. If he wants to travel, he can always visit his "friend without limits", Xi Jinping, whom he has already met more than 30 times since 2013[2]. And if he wants to come to Europe, the International Criminal Court in The Hague will have a few questions for him.
[1] On March 2 2022 a resolution entitled "Aggression against Ukraine" by 141 votes votes in favor, 35 abstentions, and 5 votes against. A new resolution was adopted on March 24 "demanding" an "immediate" end to the war by 140 votes in favor, 38 abstentions and 5 votes against.
[2] On February 4, 2022, the two leaders adopted a Strategic Partnership under the banner of "unlimited friendship" between Russia and China. Russia and China.