Sabine Saurugger, Sciences Po Grenoble, Pacte-CNRS, and Fabien Terpan, Sciences Po Grenoble, CESICE

In many ways, the recent European elections stand out from previous European elections in that they have reshaped the political landscape. First and foremost, voter turnout was the highest it has been for 25 years, and this high level of participation helped to put an end to the two-party system in Europe, by sparking the emergence of new political forces. It now remains to be seen how the balance of power will be organized.

The 2019 European election has profoundly altered our perception of this ballot, which until now had been considered secondary and without any real influence on political issues. At the end of May, several significant developments changed the picture: a sharp rise in voter turnout, a relative weakening of the traditional political families, a strengthening of the center and the ecologists, and a contained surge of the nationalists and extremes. These results, provided they are analyzed in a comparative and European way, and not just in French or national terms, can help us to envisage the future of the integration process in Europe. What scenarios are emerging for the future of the European Union? Will the electoral results and the new composition of Parliament lead to more differentiation or more European integration?

A European analysis, not just a national one

Despite a strong push from eurosceptic and far-right parties, a broad pro-European majority emerged from the 2019 ballot. Although for the first time since the ballot was held, the Christian Democrats (EPP) and Social Democrats (S&D) lost their traditional hegemony in the European Parliament. With 179 and 153 seats respectively in the hemicycle, the two dominant political families in European politics have to contend with the rising forces represented by Renew Europe (formerly ALDE) (105 seats) and the Greens (69 seats).

While the majority needed to govern has yet to be built, the four main political groups that should make it up (European People's Party (EPP), Social Democrats (S&D), Renew Europe and the Greens) are currently working on a common roadmap to form a stable coalition. As in the previous mandate, the aim is not to erase differences or abolish political debates, but to come together on the essentials, so that the parliamentary institution can help face the challenges of the next five years. This element of continuity comes, however, in a new context.

Firstly, the 2019 elections have in fact led to a more fragmented situation, where no single winner has really emerged. The post-election coalition games confirm that the logic of Spitzenkandidaten (political group heads of list), first introduced in 2014, is now inoperative. The system is designed so that the European party with the majority wins the Commission presidency. Although the EPP has the largest number of elected members (179), it is significantly down on 2014 (217) and, even with the possible support of S&D, does not have an absolute majority (376). The losses suffered by the EPP and S&D, due in particular to the German, but also the French and British electoral results, as well as the need to form a four-party majority with the Greens and Renew Europe, make the negotiations for the major European posts to be filled all the more bitter and open.

Secondly, the new balance of power between these political groups is not completely fixed. What's more, the Brexit, the timing of which remains highly uncertain, is likely to change things still further. For example, if the British MEPs were to leave the European Parliament, the EPP would find itself in a proportionally better position than the Social Democrats and the centrists, then diminished by the Labour and Lib-Dems respectively. This is due to the fact that British Conservatives do not sit in the EPP but in the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). However, a possible departure of Fidesz from the EPP, from which the Hungarian Conservative Party is currently suspended, would further diminish the weight of what remains Europe's leading political family, while perhaps giving it more internal coherence.

Thirdly, the new Parliament saw a strong breakthrough for the Greens, concentrated mainly in Western Europe (Germany, Austria, French-speaking Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), with only one real setback in Sweden - a paradoxical setback since this is the country of the muse of the climate protests that ginned up the campaign, Greta Thunberg. Die Grünen in Germany, on the other hand, found themselves in a strong position, far ahead of the Social Democrats. This dynamic is strongly linked to the mobilization of the young electorate. In Germany, 34% of 18-24 year-olds voted for Green candidates, compared with 11% for the CDU and 8% for the SPD.

The result is much the same in France, where this age group also voted first for the Greens, continuing their good result of 2009. Environmental concerns, however, are also strongly expressed by other parties, in particular the centrists and the left: it will therefore be more difficult for the Greens to maintain this claim alone in future discussions. As for the future Commission, it will have to take account of the fact that the issue of the ecological transition came to the fore during the European election.

Lastly, the predicted nationalist wave did indeed take place, but in a differentiated way. The success of Nigel Farage's Brexit Party was a major factor. This alone makes it the biggest provider of elected representatives to the European Parliament, with 29 seats (30.8% of the British vote). Another important victory was that of Matteo Salvini in Italy (34.33% of the vote, 28 elected), making the League the heavyweight of the European far right. Elsewhere, however, results are more relative. In Germany, the AfD obtained just 10.8%, a slight decline since 2014. In France, the RN, although back in the lead (23.3% of the vote), lost a seat compared to 2014. Poland's ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party (45.4% of the vote, or 26 seats) surged ahead. Elsewhere, across Europe, the elections marked a defeat for various far-right formations. Jobbik collapsed in Hungary, as did Ataka, which scored 1% in Bulgaria. The neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn in Greece, Vox in Spain, Ekre in Estonia, Geert Wilders' party in the Netherlands and the Czech far-right (SPD) also scored poorly. The Danish People's Party was the biggest loser among sovereigntists compared to 2014, while the Sweden Democrats only came third. In total, sovereigntist, eurosceptic and europhobic parties won 176 of the 751 seats, or 23% of the hemicycle.

These results must be seen against the backdrop of strong citizen participation. Far from being influenced by the existence of the "yellow vests", as several commentators felt it necessary to point out - unless you consider that the movement would have strongly influenced German, Spanish, Austrian, Polish, British, Italian citizens... - it is the highest in twenty-five years at over 50%. The fact that a greater number of citizens found it necessary to take part in the election shows a certain awareness of the importance of European issues. This puts pressure on member states, as negotiations for positions of responsibility in the European Union continue. This increased participation, and the political recomposition it is bringing about, could also have a wider influence on the policies pursued by the European Union over the next five years, and on the future of the Union as a political entity in general.

What are the consequences for EU policies and European democracy?

National executives must necessarily take account of the results of the European elections. This means, first and foremost, appointing European leaders who take account of the new balances, whether for the posts of President of the European Council, High Representative for Foreign Affairs, President and Vice-President of the Commission, or President and Vice-Presidents of the Parliament. In addition, the election is likely to have an impact on all the Union's policies.

Consensus-building, which has been part of the Union's DNA since the 1950s, is here to stay. It could, however, take two new directions compared to the previous mandate: a centralization of the political line of the Parliament and the Commission, due to the weight acquired by the Renew Europe group; a greening of legislative action under the influence of the Greens, but also of the pro-environment positions displayed by a number of elected representatives within the S&D and Renew Europe groups in particular.

The much-maligned opposition between progressives and nationalists is likely to take shape when it comes to adopting regulations and directives. Indeed, in order to achieve a majority in the Parliament, members of the EPP, S&D, Renew Europe and the Greens will have to come to an agreement, otherwise the Union's policies will be blocked by a disparate group of nationalists, populists and eurosceptics. But the debate on European policies cannot be limited to this opposition. If the Union is to be governed in the long term, compromises will have to be found at the end of a confrontation of ideas that goes beyond the progressive/nationalist divide. In the Parliament, but also within the Council of Ministers and the European Council (Heads of State and Government), we need to move away from a sterile opposition between two clear-cut options: further integration or a retreat into national identities. Several forms of European integration will have to be discussed if European democracy is to take root.

Beyond the adoption of European laws, the governance of the Union as a whole is at stake. European elections reinforce the diversity of viewpoints within the Parliament, as well as the contingent of Europhobic and Eurosceptic MEPs. Should we respond by increasing differentiation, variable geometry and concessions to member states wishing to preserve their sovereignty? The solution may seem logical, but it runs up against a reality: when the elections are over, MEPs in favor of further integration always represent a strong majority. What's more, further differentiation would make the European system even less comprehensible, and therefore more difficult for citizens to understand.

Since the European elections were marked by increased citizen participation, why not draw the consequences of this by strengthening the position of the Parliament a little more? It's true that the powers of the European assembly have been considerably strengthened in the past, but there's still room for improvement: the Parliament has no power of legislative initiative, and is only marginally involved in Economic and Monetary Union. On the first point, Parliament depends on the Commission, which may or may not propose the regulations or directives desired by MEPs. Giving it a direct right of initiative would strengthen the democratic functioning of the Union. On the second point, Economic and Monetary Union is implemented by the European Central Bank for monetary matters, and by the Commission and the Council for economic matters.

Some have proposed the creation of a Eurozone Parliament, made up not only of European MPs, but also of between 50% and 80% of national MPs. The creation of a new body is difficult to justify when there is already a European Parliament for the Union as a whole. How can it be imagined that the economic governance of the European Union could fall within the remit of the Eurozone Parliament, while its social policy, asylum and immigration policy or regional policy would fall within the remit of the European Parliament? To create a new assembly, outside the European treaties, would be to call into question the legitimacy of the existing European Parliament, and would reflect a logic of dismantling the EU. It's hard to see how the new assembly, elected by indirect universal suffrage, would be more legitimate than the European Parliament, elected by direct universal suffrage by European citizens. Adding another institutional layer would make the system even more complex, at a time when the European Union is already perceived by citizens as an organization that is difficult to grasp.

On the other hand, strengthening the prerogatives of the European Parliament and transforming the voting system have many advantages. The European Parliament, or a part of it comprising Eurozone MPs, could well become more involved in the design and implementation of economic governance, without the need to create a new institution. Apart from the Parliament, citizen participation today takes many different forms. Since the early 1990s, the institutions and member states of the European Union have put in place a series of instruments to compensate for the European Union's perceived or real democratic deficit: the transparency register governing lobbying practices, the European Citizens' Initiative, and the systematic involvement of organized civil society in all legislative proposals.

What we have seen most clearly, however, since the start of the European crises (economic and financial crisis, migration crisis, rise of populism and illiberal democracies) is that these instruments are not seen by citizens as a solution. Neither the introduction of instruments that strengthen representative democracy or add elements of participatory democracy, nor the reinforcement of the legal framework guaranteeing greater control by European institutions, nor a temporary suspension of existing legal frameworks (and thus more freedom for member states to act individually, as we saw with the suspension of Schengen and the introduction of border controls), seem to diminish citizens' deep-seated skepticism about European integration, or democratic systems more generally.

How can we compensate for the democratic deficit?

Our argument here is that these instruments cannot compensate for the democratic deficit, because the very principles of representative democracy are being called into question. Skepticism about democratic institutions is on the rise at both national and European level. Extremist and populist parties are enjoying growing success in the member countries of the European Union - the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Italy... to name but a few - irrespective of their country's objective level of integration. Since the citizens of the European Union are increasingly disillusioned with democracy, the tools put in place by the EU system cannot bear fruit: once democracy is criticized and rejected in its very foundations, the improvements made to the democratic system are not enough to win over citizens. Unlike states such as China and Russia (authoritarian regimes), or Brazil and India (fragile democracies), the European Union's democratic deficit seems to have more to do with the rejection of its citizens than with the nature of its system.

How can we take advantage of the upsurge in voter turnout to encourage citizens to embrace the European project? Should we go back to the nation-states, give more weight to national parliamentarians, and take action that respects sovereignty more broadly? This path is favored by many, but it risks reinforcing the trend towards disintegration, even though European policies often serve the general interest - or at least as often as national policies. So, is there any other choice than overcoming the nation states to save the European Union? Treaty revisions have become difficult, as 28 ratification processes have to be completed, some by referendum. In future, revisions could be decided by a single, Union-wide referendum, giving the final say to the European people as a whole. Similarly, MEPs, or at least some of them, could be appointed on the basis of Europe-wide transnational lists.

However, these solutions can only be effective if political life and public debate in the member states become more Europeanized. Member state governments should explain European decisions and take responsibility for the fact that they have contributed to them being taken at EU level, rather than using the Union as a scapegoat. The media should publicize the European Union system, debating the role played by each of its institutions, rather than falsely suggesting that member states bow to the injunctions of "Brussels" (understood as an areopagus of supranational technocrats). States take part in European decision-making at all levels, as do the people, via their representatives in the European Parliament.

The European election is the expression of a European democratic life: it should be debated, both during the campaign and once the results are known, as such, and not as a second-rate national election. Alongside institutional reforms, it is also and above all from practice that a better government of the Union can emerge. The support of Europe's citizens depends as much on the quality of public debate as on the institutional architecture: political leaders must bring European issues down to the level of the national public arena, and avoid making Europe too easy a scapegoat. Analysts must look beyond the national framework and raise the debate to the level of Europe as a whole.

This analysis was originally published on the AOC [Analyse Opinion Critique] July 03, 2019.