Selcan Karabektaş, doctoral student at Grenoble Alpes University and researcher at CERDAP2
Located in of the African continent, the Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti, is today the scene of considerable stakes, both for traditional and regional powers alike. In the past, the focus was on the rivalry between the "great powers" in this region, particularly that of China and the USA, but today the Horn of Africa has the Horn of Africa has become a crucial battleground for new, competing regional regional competitors. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, Iran and Egypt are the main regional players defending their interests in the Horn of Africa.
Two contemporary factors can be highlighted to underline the importance of a region that attracts economic and military investment from emerging economies. The first factor is geographical. It stems from the fact that the Horn borders the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mendeb Strait, one of the world's most important shipping routes. The strategic importance of this strait is crucial, as most trade between the markets of Asia, the Middle East and Europe passes through it. More than 10% of the world's sea freight passes through here every year, including the majority of Asia's trade with Europe. For strategic reasons, many countries want to strengthen their presence in this region. In addition, the second factor that makes the Horn of Africa so important is that the region is considered one of the main gateways to the African market by countries in Asia and the Middle East.
The proliferation of military bases in the Horn of of Africa
The last few years have been marked by a race to build military bases by various traditional and regional powers, intent on taking advantage of the region's geostrategic assets for both economic and military reasons. Djibouti, which is seeking to become a veritable regional strategic hub and is considered the gateway to East Africa, is the main focus of the military presence of the countries concerned. Djibouti is home to six military bases: those of the United States, Japan (its only military base outside its territory), Italy, China, Saudi Arabia and France (its largest overseas military base). In fact, Djibouti currently has the largest number of military installations of this type in the world.
The growing number of foreign military bases and the constant presence of military personnel of various nationalities in the countries of the Horn of Africa, particularly Djibouti, underline the security, economic and geopolitical importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait for the region. Eritrea, for its part, hosts military bases from Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Somalia is also home to a Turkish military base, while the UAE's second base is in Somaliland, a region that has seceded from Somalia. The UAE, which has invested heavily in the region's ports (notably Djibouti, Puntland and Somaliland), opened a base in Eritrea in 2015, and recently signed an agreement with Somaliland.
Russia is now planning to establish a second base in Sudan. The commercial scale of these establishments is important not least for the fragile economies of the countries in the region, but could have lasting consequences for the stability and security of the Horn of Africa. In addition, the presence of foreign forces and their activities in the region represent a threat to the internal security of Horn countries, which are fighting extremist groups such as al-Chabab, Boko Haram and Sahel terrorist groups.
The struggle for geopolitical influence between regional powers in the Horn of Africa
Regional relations thus revolve around two poles with opposing strategic objectives: on the one hand, an alliance of neighboring Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Emirates), and on the other, a convergence of outside countries (Qatar, Turkey linked to Iran). With its historical ties to the Ottoman Empire, the region is of particular importance to Turkey , which has extended its sphere of influence in Africa in recent years.
For the states of the Arabian Peninsula, the importance of the region has increased since their involvement in the regional war in Yemen launched in 2015, and their diplomatic conflict with Qatar, which emerged in 2017. Affected by the blockade imposed by its neighbors during the Gulf crisis in 2017, and accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar has had to review its foreign policy, particularly towards the countries of the Horn of Africa. The rivalry between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates can be seen in the race for investment in the coastal regions of the Horn of Africa. This process is aimed at controlling the most strategic areas, namely the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.
For their part, the United Arab Emirates exert considerable influence in the countries of the Horn of Africa, thanks to their economic diplomacy attracting the poorest countries around them. The Emirates' political intervention in the major events shaking the Middle East and the Arab world calls for a critical approach to its African policy. While the influence of the Chinese and Russians, and even the Turks, can be debated, Arab influence, particularly that of the Emirates and their allies, should not be underestimated. The oil transported from the Gulf countries to Europe, via the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, strengthens the geostrategic position of the Horn for the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led Arab coalition, which is active in the region, also attributes key importance to Somalia, which is close to Yemen, where civil war is ongoing and the Arab coalition is deeply involved.
The UAE's disagreement with Djibouti put an end to its military expansion plans in that country, and prompted it to look for alternative locations for bases that could support its military effort in Yemen. Against this backdrop, in 2017 the UAE launched the construction of a new base as part of an agreement between P&O Ports and the semi-autonomous Puntland region of Somalia, which holds the concession rights to the port of Bosaso for 30 years.
The American and European presence takes a back seat
Security problems for Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Turkey's commercial and military interests, and the rapid growth of political and economic activities all contribute to the critical situation in this region. Turkey is taking advantage of the fact that it has already established its own military base in Somalia. It believes that the central government's soldiers will be able to form an army strong enough to fight the al-Chabab militias. An ally of Qatar, Turkey has increased its political, economic and military presence in Somalia and Sudan, which border the Horn to the north. In late 2017, Sudan agreed to lease the Red Sea island of Suakin to Turkey for 99 years. This is a historically important former Ottoman port, as it was the obligatory crossing point for Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa making the pilgrimage to Mecca. Turkey is expected to rebuild the island's historic monuments to make it once again a major stopover for African pilgrims on their way to Mecca. Suakin could also become a base for Turkish warships, giving Ankara its first direct access to the Red Sea.
However, following the change of government after the coup in Sudan in 2019, the future of the Suakin Island restoration project has become highly uncertain. For several years now, the American and European presence in the Horn of Africa has gradually taken a back seat. China has become the main investor in the region, where it continues to develop its commercial activities. Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia attract the attention of experts with their merciless struggle for a share of the cake.
Time will tell how the countries of the Horn of Africa will position themselves, as they are often highly versatile and likely to adapt easily to changes depending on which countries become involved in the region. It's easy to see why the Horn of Africa will no doubt continue to be a complex zone of infighting and strategic confrontation in the years to come.