Jean Marcou, Professor of Law at Sciences Po Grenoble, researcher at CERDAP2 and associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul.
On March 18, 2023, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoğlu foreign affairs to Cairo, where he was welcomed by his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Choukri. Far from being a routine trip, this visit was considered a real event. a real event. In fact, the two countries had not met for ten years between the two countries had not taken place at such a high level of protocol. This Turkish-Egyptian This Turkish-Egyptian warming takes place, however, against a backdrop of intense regional diplomatic activity. regional diplomatic activity, which is much broader in scope, and sees the strategic in the Middle East, as a result of the war in Ukraine. war in Ukraine.
A laborious rapprochement Turkish-Egyptian
The arrival of the head of Turkish diplomacy in Cairo may appear to be the logical culmination of two years of renewed contacts. In the spring of 2021, the two frenemies of the eastern Mediterranean had announced their intention to put an end to the quarrel that had followed Abdel Fattah al-Sissi's accession to power. The military's ouster of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood president elected a year earlier, had led to a deterioration in Turkish-Egyptian diplomatic relations to chargé d'affaires level, with the Turkish ambassador to Cairo declared "persona non grata" in November 2013. Subsequently, while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan never missed an opportunity in international forums to refer to the Egyptian head of state as a "putschist", the gulf had widened further between the two countries, taking on not only a political, but also an economic dimension. At the same time, in 2017, Turkey drew closer to Iran in various theaters of operation, setting up the Astana process with the latter and Russia to try and resolve the Syrian conflict, and supporting Qatar alongside the Islamic Republic to help the latter overcome the embargo imposed on it by its neighbors.
This was a time of increasing diplomatic incidents between Turkey and Egypt's Gulf allies, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the question of sharing gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean and Turkish intervention in the second Libyan civil war further sharpened the rivalry between Cairo and Ankara, leading some observers to claim that Turkish-Arab relations as a whole were once again becoming as execrable as they had been during the Cold War.
In the first half of 2021 Joe Biden's inauguration gave the impression that a new era was dawning. is opening up, the two countries are beginning to draw closer together. But this is laborious. Although Turkey has silenced Egyptian opponents on its territory, the bilateral meetings that take place on a regular basis to translate into action. Even more worryingly, in October 2022, Turkey signed a hydrocarbon exploration hydrocarbon exploration agreement with Libya, echoing the one signed in 2019 2019, the two countries had delimited their exclusive economic maritime zone, much to the dismay of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt. Cairo's reaction was swift the rapprochement talks initiated in 2021 were suspended, and some are already and some are already predicting a return to the status quo ante. However, the revival of the Turkish-Egyptian quarrel has not taken place, as the regional context shows every day how much it has changed. The war in Ukraine is reinforcing the attenuation of long-lasting confrontations in the Middle East, which was the backdrop to the dispute between Cairo and Ankara...
The end of the new Cold War
The symbol of this new and the ambiguous dynamics of appeasement is undoubtedly the reconciliation reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, overseen by China. The breakdown in diplomatic relations between the two countries, following the execution of the leader of the Saudi Shiite community, Nimr Baqr al Nimr, in January 2016, reflected the advent of a new rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh. Riyadh, which some had not hesitated to see as the harbinger of a veritable cold war in the Middle East. The Saudi-Iranian détente, consecrated in Beijing on March 10, 2023, was was on the agenda, as it had been on the diplomatic agenda of both countries for the past two years. The real surprise, however, was role played by China, which, by interfering in this way, confirms the political the political position it has acquired in the Middle East in recent years the Middle East, spectacularly filling the void left by the United States. United States.
China's growing presence on the China's growing presence on the Middle Eastern stage also stems from the strategic caused by the war in Ukraine, which has brought the interests of both the interests of the two rivals. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Iran's Iran's support for Russia has reached a crescendo. While Saudi Arabia Arabia formally condemned the invasion of Ukraine, it has not subsequently sanctions against Moscow. Russians and Saudis soon came together came together to oppose Washington's desire to increase global hydrocarbon production production and to defend crude oil prices, the former to finance the war they the former to finance the war they had started, and the latter to support the to support the conversion of their economies. The OPEC+'s decision to lower its production quotas on October 5, 2022, was seen by the United States as a real betrayal by a Saudi Arabia Arabia, which no longer hesitates to show its convergence of views with Russia and China China, when its interests so dictate.
In the summer of 2022, just as Riyadh's defection on the energy front was taking shape, the American president visited Saudi Arabia, agreeing to meet Prince Mohamed Ben Salmane (MBS), something he had sworn never to do after the Khashoggi affair. But this Canossa in the Middle East was not enough to win back the good graces of a Saudi ally, which in recent years, and particularly under the impetus of MBS, has succeeded in gaining a degree of latitude that now allows it to coexist its historic relationship with the United States, on the one hand, with new convergences with China or Russia, on the other.
What is most worrying for The most worrying aspect for Westerners is that this Saudi standoff is not an exception in the Gulf. Gulf, since in this area the Emirates are even ahead of the game. Abu Dhabi went so far as to to abstain from voting at the United Nations Security Council on the US resolution resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, the day after their entry into Ukraine. Subsequently, although the Emiratis have formally condemned the Russian invasion in various forums, their refusal to implement sanctions against Moscow took on the appearance of a neutrality that increasingly resembled with complacency. For Dubai has meanwhile become one of the world's financial sanctuaries, enabling Russia to acquire goods that international that international markets claim to prohibit it from acquiring, in application of Western sanctions.
Is the Gulf the new Middle East?
The importance of the Gulf in the Middle East can also be seen in the constant visits made there by Bashar el-Assad, over the past year. The matter finally began to be taken very seriously on March 19, 2023, when the Syrian the Syrian president, accompanied by his wife Asma, was solemnly welcomed solemnly welcomed to Abu Dhabi by Sheikh Mohamed Ben Zayed (MBZ). In fact, to understand the significance of this event, we must remember that the that the Emirates reopened their embassy in Damascus at the end of the end of 2018, and note that Saudi Arabia, more reticent at the outset to do the same shortly. It was also in the Emirates, a year ago a year ago (on March 18, 2022) that the Syrian head of state made his first visit to an Arab country, since the start of the civil war in 2011, before being welcomed in Oman by Sultan Haitham Ben Tarek on February 22, 2023. While it's true that the last two the Syrian leader's last two trips to the Gulf, to Oman and the Emirates are also linked to the search for funds to deal with the consequences of the earthquake earthquake that struck Turkey and his country on February 6, they certainly that they mark the Baathist regime's return to the Middle East, and that they scene, and herald its imminent reintegration into the Arab League. League. By working to normalize Syria's status on the international stage international arena, the Gulf states are consolidating a movement which, for several years now marginalized the West in the settlement of the Syrian conflict, while bringing bringing Damascus back into the Arab fold, after long years of privileged relations with Moscow and, above all, Teheran.
The importance of the Gulf was also perceived by Turkey, another major player in the region. In the wake of his first return to Egypt, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received Prince MBZ in November 2021, before making his own visit to the Emirates in February 2022, marking the end of a rift between Ankara and Abu Dhabi that had been deepening since the start of the Arab Spring. Similarly, the Turkish president received MBS in Turkey in June 2022, after having visited Saudi Arabia in April 2022, to restore, not without difficulty, a relationship that had been severely damaged by the assassination of dissident journalist Jamal Khasshogi, which had taken place at the kingdom's consulate general in Istanbul. Behind this renewed Turkish interest in the Gulf lie the economic and financial concerns of a country facing a particularly severe economic crisis. At the beginning of March 2023, when the Emirates had just signed a free-trade agreement with Ankara, the Saudi Fund for Development deposited $5 billion with the Turkish Central Bank to support the country's economy, which had been badly shaken by the consequences of the earthquake of February 6.
But beyond these prosaic reasons, this move is also motivated by diplomatic concerns. For several months now, Ankara has been trying to re-engage with Damascus, hoping to encourage some of the 4 million Syrian refugees it shelters on its soil to return home. But the Baathist regime does not seem inclined to negotiate, until the Turkish army has evacuated the territories it occupies, following three military interventions since 2016. The support of the Gulf in this process could thus prove invaluable, and all the more so as the Russians seem to be backing the Syrian demands, at a time when they are beginning to doubt the loyalty of their Turkish friends. Under pressure from the West, the Turkish authorities have, for the first time, tightened their customs policy to prevent Moscow from circumventing international sanctions. This pro-Western stance could be reinforced, should the opposition win, in the elections scheduled for May 14, 2023. But we're not there yet...