Jean Marcou, Professor of Law at Sciences Po Grenoble, researcher at CERDAP2 and associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul.

In these times of global warming, Turkey is also in a state of diplomatic overheating. overheated. Ukraine, NATO, Syria, Iraq, the Gulf, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world. Arab world, Turkish diplomacy has been on all fronts this summer, signing agreements to sign agreements, restore relations, negotiate complex alliances, clear perilous perilous situations or stubborn disputes. This phenomenon culminated on July 22, 2022, when Ankara, with the support of the UN, succeeded in Russia and Ukraine to sign an agreement creating maritime safety security corridors in the Black Sea, allowing Ukrainian grain Ukrainian grain exports. And yet, we all know that after the heatwave, episodes of brutal cold are not far off... As far as Turkish diplomacy is concerned Turkish diplomacy, they may even have already begun to appear... already...

Turkish-Saudi diplomatic springtime in the Gulf

Turkish hyper-activism was preceded by a springtime diplomatic offensive in the Gulf. in the Gulf. At the end of April 2022, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan travelled to Saudi Arabia, to put an end to several years of quarrelling with Riyadh, and more generally, with Turkey. years of quarrel with Riyadh, and more generally with its allies allies in the Arab world, starting with the Emirates. In November 2021, Mohammed ben Zayed (MBZ), the Emirati leader, came to Turkey to Turkey before a visit by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to Abu Dhabi (the first in ten years) confirmed the reconciliation between two countries that had often displayed major disagreements, in several international theaters, in recent years.

If If the restoration of Turkish-Saudi relations has taken an even more spectacular turn spectacular turn, it is because these relations had been deeply affected four years ago, by the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, at the kingdom's consulate general in Istanbul. Without naming Prince Mohammed bin Salmane (MBS) in person, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had accused, before the Turkish parliament, "the highest levels" of the Saudi Saudi government of being responsible for the dissident journalist's death, in a the death of the dissident journalist, at a time when Turkey seemed closer to Iran in regional with Iran in regional conflicts, having supported Qatar against its Gulf neighbors Gulf neighbors in 2017, and harshly criticized the Saudi-Qatari in Yemen, after approving it at the outset in 2015. This Turkish reconciliation with the two dominant players on the Arabian Peninsula Arabian peninsula has also bolstered a similar move by Ankara, a year earlier, with their Egyptian ally. Finally, in 2022, Turkey and these Turkey and these Arab countries took similar positions on the war in Ukraine the war in Ukraine, denouncing the Russian invasion but refusing to implement sanctions against Moscow, much to the chagrin of the United States. United States.

Turkey, mediator in the Ukrainian crisis

However, even as it with the Gulf monarchies, Turkish diplomacy was keeping its eyes kept its eyes on Ukraine. Even before the outbreak of hostilities even before the outbreak of hostilities, it had posed as a mediator in the Russian-Ukrainian Russian-Ukrainian antagonism, emphasizing its good relations with both protagonists in the conflict. From Kiev, in early February 2022, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had announced the forthcoming summit between Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. We know what what happened in the weeks that followed, and the outbreak of war contributed to undermining Turkey's mediation efforts. But the fact remains it has to be said that, after the start of the conflict, Turkey's efforts in this area did not cease, although they were not immediately convincing. conviction. So much so, that when Sergei Lavrov visited Ankara in mid-June to Ankara to discuss with his Turkish counterpart the opening of secure the opening of secure Black Sea grain export corridors, skepticism was still rife. and many even found it suspicious that Turkey could initiate such a process without involving the Ukraine. However, Ankara was quick to do so, even though to do so, just as the Ukrainian army was going through a difficult period the second Russian offensive. The consecration of Turkish efforts came with the conclusion of the on July 22, 2022, or more precisely with the signing of two separate two separate but identical documents (Kiev refused to formally initial a a single document with Moscow), at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, under the Istanbul, under the aegis of Turkey and the UN.

This text provides for the creation of maritime safety corridors to allow the passage passage of merchant ships evacuating Ukrainian grain. A joint coordination center (CCC), based in Istanbul and comprising representatives of the parties to the agreement (Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, UN), is responsible for responsible for inspecting ships as they leave the Black Sea. In compensation, a memorandum signed by Russia and the UN stipulates that Western that Western sanctions should not affect Russian agricultural products and fertilizers. and fertilizers. Even if this was already the case, problems arising from transport insurance complications or banking hindrances constitute a kind of indirect sanctions, which Moscow would like to see lifted in return for the resumption in return for the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports. Since the end of July, this agreement has been implemented, enabling 100 ships carrying 2.5 million tonnes of grain to cross the Bosphorus. Bosphorus. They are still a long way from evacuating the 20 million tonnes tonnes of grain stuck in Ukrainian silos, but the agreement the agreement is unquestionably a success for Turkish diplomacy, even if it was not the only object of their summer frenzy.

NATO, Syria, the ups and downs of Turkish summer diplomacy

Also linked to the war in Ukraine, NATO's enlargement to include Sweden and Finland has also also put Turkey in the international media spotlight. media spotlight. Even though in May 2022, the two Nordic countries their legendary neutrality, Ankara objected to this pretense of opposed this claim, citing their alleged links with Kurdish organisations with Kurdish organizations considered "terrorist". A In support of its request, the Turkish government sent Sweden, in particular a list of "suspicious" persons residing on its territory, requesting their requesting their extradition. Moreover, seizing this pretext to demonstrate its determination to combat Kurdish "terrorism the idea of a new military intervention against the Kurdish YPG militia. Kurdish YPG militias in northern Syria, on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. the Euphrates. If, at the NATO summit in Madrid on June 29, 2022, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan finally agreed to his agreement to the two Scandinavian candidates joining the Alliance, he maintained his plans for military intervention in Rojava.

However, this project depends not so much on the West as on the Russians, who control Syria's airspace in Syria. That's why it was discussed as early as Sergueï Lavrov's visit to Turkey in June 2022, to discuss grain Black Sea grain corridors, without really winning the support of the Russian of Russian diplomacy. The issue was raised at the tripartite summit in Teheran (Turkey, Iran, Russia) at the beginning of August 2022 again failed to obtain Moscow's green light, and met with open hostility hostility from Teheran. Since then, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has constantly reiterated his determination to lead this new military operation, without daring to take action for the time being.

The normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations

This disappointment was offset, however, by another significant diplomatic breakthrough. On August 17, 2022, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, announced the normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations, which in fact led to the return of ambassadors to both countries after a 4-year absence. The quarrel between Ankara and the Hebrew state goes back much further, however. It goes back to the Mavi Marmaranaffair of 2010, the boarding of a Turkish ship by Israeli commandos, which caused the death of 9 Turkish humanitarian aid workers. In March 2013, Israel apologized to Ankara in a bid to renew relations with Turkey, but it wasn't until 2016 that the two countries normalized their relations. This reconciliation was short-lived, however, as in 2018, following the death of some 50 Palestinian demonstrators in Gaza, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Tel Aviv and expelled the Israeli ambassador.

All this the two countries have often taken similar positions in the region (Syria, Caucasus...). positions in the region (Syria, the Caucasus, etc.) and their shared economic interests (tourism, energy). economic interests (tourism, energy). Since then, contacts have intensive negotiations had been underway for several months. This convergence was illustrated by the Israeli President Isaac Herzog's visit to Turkey in March 2022, and that of Israeli Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid to Ankara in June 2022. By the Israeli bombardment of Gaza, which killed dozens of people dozens of people at the beginning of August, had no effect on the ongoing restoration process, even though Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly reiterated his his commitment to defending the Palestinian cause. For economic economic and strategic reasons, it is understandable that Turkey was keen to this reconciliation and has pursued it to the end, whatever the political cost. politically.

Turkish diplomacy: from a promising summer to more difficult times?

This intense Turkish summer activity has thus confirmed Turkey's role as a regional power. Turkey can play in the great gas game in the Eastern Mediterranean, bringing it out of the isolation of its gunboat policy, in the great gas game in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the course of 2020. The grain agreement of July 22, 2022 is in fact the first between Russia and Ukraine since the start of the conflict. conflict. The war in Ukraine shows that that Ankara's long-standing policy of keeping the West at arm's length from Russia Ankara has been practicing for several years has not disappeared, and has even spectacularly reinforced. In the great divide between East and West, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has added a skilful between Russia and Ukraine, while contributing to attempts to prevent the global attempts to avert the global food crisis; a move that satisfies countries of the South, particularly in Africa, where Turkey has been to strengthen its positions. This balancing act disorientating Turkey's Western allies was further illustrated during a Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's tour of the Balkans in the Balkans in early September 2022, during which he criticized Western sanctions against Russia and called for Moscow's agricultural exports to be that Moscow's agricultural exports be guaranteed in order to ensure the continuity of the famous July 22 agreement. Clearly, in the Black Sea, Ankara has acquired a new strategic a new strategic dimension in the Black Sea, giving it a seat at the table with the table.

Beyond the straits, however, Turkey finds itself grappling with a much more traditional and regional conflict. Relations with Greece, in particular, which had brightened at the start of the war in Ukraine, rapidly deteriorated thereafter, due to the reactivation of old conflicts (the Aegean continental shelf, Cyprus, the sharing of gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean, etc.) and the new phenomena previously observed. Turkey's rise to power, which is also reflected in a strengthening of its military capabilities (production of sophisticated weaponry, such as drones), is reviving Greece's obsessive fear of its neighbor, and leading it to acquire costly weaponry (French aircraft and ships, American drones, etc.). Finally, Greece's diplomatic activism towards Europe, the United States and the Eastern Mediterranean exasperates Ankara.

Further south, despite reconciliation in the Gulf, Turkey's approaches to the Arab world have yielded the Arab world have so far produced mixed results. mixed results. Significantly, Sedat Peker, the Turkish mafioso mafioso residing in the Emirates, continues to rattle the Turkish circles with his corrosive revelations on YouTube. And on 8 September 2022, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Arab League denounced Turkish Turkish interference in Arab affairs. Behind this attack which Turkey did not expect, is the Arab world's disapproval of Turkey's the Arab world's disapproval of Turkish military intervention against the Kurds in Iraq and planned for Syria. It's true that, for the first time first time since the start of the civil war, Ankara raised the idea, in August 2022, the idea with the Damascus regime, at a time when the Arab League is also considering is also considering doing so. While this may create new synergies on both sides, but the complexity of relations with Arab countries indicates that, after a promising summer, Turkish diplomacy could well experience a more difficult winter and autumn. a more difficult winter and autumn.