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The United States on a collision course with its historic allies in the Middle East

At a glance

Date

October 30, 2022

Theme

Middle East

Jean Marcou, Professor of Law at Sciences Po Grenoble, researcher at CERDAP2 and associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul.

A latecomer to the Middle East, at the end of the Second World War, the United States has three three historic allies in this part of the world: Saudi Arabia Turkey and Israel.

The convergence between Washington and Riyadh is traditionally traced back to the meeting that took place on the cruiser Quincy on February 14, 1945, between President Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud, founder of the contemporary Saudi Kingdom. What came to be known as the "Quincy Pact" consisted of a tacit, enigmatic agreement promising the Saud family the protection of the United States in return for the opportunity to exploit Saudi oil resources.

At the same time, İsmet İnönü's Turkey had just entered the war on the side of the Allies against the Axis powers, abandoning a neutralist posture in line with the policy of national independence that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had observed since the beginnings of the republic. This pro-Western stance was later confirmed by the country's acceptance of the Marshall Plan in 1947, followed by NATO membership in 1952.

American support for Israel came later, as the Hebrew state's first allies were the United Kingdom and France. It was at the time of the Six-Day War, when General de Gaulle decreed an embargo on military equipment destined for Israel and the USSR's support for the Arab world intensified, that Washington established an alliance with Tel Aviv that was to prove indestructible.

While these alliances have never been formally denied, they have, of course, evolved as regional and international balances have changed. One might have thought that the Biden presidency, and even more so the outbreak of war in Ukraine, would lead to closer ties between the United States and its historic allies in the Middle East. However, a quick assessment of the situation, eight months after the start of the Ukrainian conflict, shows that in reality this is not the case. While the three states have condemned the Russian invasion in international forums, they have been much less inclined to sanction Russia economically and distance themselves from it politically, settling into a position of great distance that they do not seem ready to abandon, and which they cultivate according to developments in the conflict.

The Turkey more mediator than true ally

If there's one country out of the three for which this this ambiguous stance came as no surprise, it was Turkey. Over the the last two decades, Ankara has often shown that its relationship with Washington is not an easy one. As early as 2003, during the intervention in Iraq, Turkey refused to allow the US to open a second to open a second front on its border with Iraq, by attacking the latter from from Turkish soil. Thereafter, disagreements multiplied, notably after the start of the war in Syria, with the Turkish government condemning US support for the Kurdish YPG militia in Rojava, before moving closer ties with Russia and Iran in 2017, in what came to be known as the the "Astana process", an informal structure aimed at achieving a to reach a negotiated solution to the conflict, without the endorsement of the and the UN. This posture has been fueled by a densification of Russian-Turkish Russian-Turkish economic and energy relations, which began since the end of the Cold War, and the development of increasingly intense political ties, at a time when Turkish-Western relations were weakening.

Even as he conceded to the Russians the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant and suspected the USA of involvement in the 2016 coup attempt, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had no hesitation in acquiring Russian S-400 air defense missiles, while agreeing to enter into the construction of the TurkStream gas pipeline that bypasses Ukraine by the south to supply European markets. In 2014, however, the Turkish leader strongly condemned the annexation of Crimea, before denouncing subsequent Russian infringements of Ukrainian sovereignty. At the same time, Ankara has not hesitated to develop fruitful economic and military cooperation with Ukraine, notably by delivering Bayraktar TB2 combat drones.

The fact remains that, since the start of the war, Turkey has constantly intervened with the Russians to accredit a sometimes ambiguous mediation role. It has to be said that this diplomatic activism eventually led to two concrete agreements between the belligerents: on July 22, 2022, the Russians agreed to open secure corridors in the Black Sea to allow the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports; on September 22, 2022, once again under the aegis of Turkey and the UN, the two countries agreed to an exchange of prisoners.

To achieve these results, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been involved in Western cenacles such as NATO(Madrid summit, June 29-30, 2022) or the EU(European Political Community in Prague, October 6, 2022), as well as in meetings overseen by Russia and/or China(seventh meeting of the Astana process, July 18, 2022, in Teheran, Shanghai Economic Organization summit, September 15-16, 2022, in Samarkand, 6th CICA summit, October 12-13, 2022, in Astana), not to mention numerous direct or telephone contacts with the Russian or Ukrainian presidents.

Although they have not officially condemned these mediation initiatives, the United States and its allies have at times been baffled by the balancing act Turkey has been required to perform, and all the more so as it has often drawn glowing compliments from Moscow. On October 27, 2022, at a meeting of the Valdaï think tank in Moscow, Vladimir Putin described Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a "strong leader" and "reliable partner". The previous October 13, on the sidelines of the 6th CICA summit, the Russian president had declared his desire to make Turkey "a gas hub" on Europe's doorstep, a proposal that had not failed to intrigue many European capitals at a time when they were trying to put an end to their Russian supplies. It's easy to see why these Russian-Turkish convergences are prompting Turkey's Western allies to question the latter's strategic positioning in the midst of the Ukrainian conflict...

Saudi Arabia frees itself from American tutelage

The first attacks on the strong US-Saudi convergence, which prevailed during and after the Cold War, do not date back to the Ukrainian conflict. However, the disagreements that had arisen earlier seemed more cyclical and less intense. It will be recalled that the JCPoA(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), better known as the "2015 Vienna Agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue", had been greeted with concern by Saudi Arabia, whose rivalry with the Islamic Republic was increasing dramatically, to the point of often being described at the time as a kind of Middle Eastern Cold War.

Donald Trump's cancellation of the agreement in 2018 did not prevent his successor, Joe Biden, from trying to restore it three years later by opening new negotiations. To this initial dispute was added, in February 2021, the publication of a US intelligence report, showing that Mohammed bin Salmane (MBS) had in person "validated" the murder of the dissident Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, at the Istanbul Consulate General, on October 2, 2018. This revelation echoed statements by candidate Biden, who during his election campaign had denounced the role played by MBS in this affair, affirming his determination to have no relationship with a leader he said he wanted to isolate on the international stage, to make him a "pariah".

From the outset of the war in Ukraine, it was clear that Saudi Arabia, while voting in favor of condemning the Russian invasion at the United Nations General Assembly on March 2, 2022, was not keen to sacrifice a political and economic relationship patiently built up with Moscow over the past few years to a war it clearly perceived as not its own. As a result, it soon became clear that Riyadh was not applying Western sanctions, either by increasing its imports of Russian fuel oil to preserve its own hydrocarbon stocks, or by refusing to accede to American demands to reduce world crude oil production in order to reduce Russian oil revenues, or even by justifying its refusal to reduce oil production on the pretext that a possible return of Iran to the markets, following a reinstatement of the 2015 agreement, risked sending prices back down. Joe Biden's visit to Saudi Arabia on July 15 and 16, 2022 failed to restore confidence between the American President and the Saudi Crown Prince. In any case, the former failed to obtain a firm commitment from the latter to lower oil prices against his international rehabilitation.

The White House in Washington DC (photo by Jean Marcou, 2017)

Indeed, OPEC+'s decision to cut its oil production by 2 million barrels a day (compared with the expected reduction of two to four times less) at its meeting in Vienna on October 5, 2022, was seen by the United States as a real slap in the face inflicted by a Saudi Arabia that had become Moscow's objective ally within the organization. This initiative confirmed the kingdom's ability to emancipate itself from American tutelage and play its own card on the international stage, to put its own interests first, those of expensive oil intended to finance the ambitious economic diversification programs of the "Ambition 2030" program launched by the Crown Prince.

The White House has made its displeasure known. Jake Sullivan, the US President's National Security Advisor, said the US would "reassess" its position towards the Saudis, who are accused of "siding with Russia against the interests of the American people". This reassessment could even concern US military aid to Saudi Arabia, including the resupply of arms and ammunition. Riyadh reacted by explaining that the October 5, 2022 decision was not political, before arguing that it had been reached unanimously and was motivated "by purely technical reasons", aimed at ensuring "the stability and balance of world markets". Ten days later, to put on a brave face, Saudi Arabia announced a $400 million humanitarian aid package for Kiev, but presented it as the kingdom's contribution to de-escalating tensions, rather than as a genuine commitment to Ukraine.

Israel preserves its immediate interests with Russia

Israel's disagreements with the United States, prior to the war in Ukraine, run parallel to those experienced by Saudi Arabia in its relationship with Washington, and even concern sometimes similar issues. In particular, the Hebrew state has taken a very dim view of the JCPoA, calling it "a historic mistake" and emphasizing that it does not consider itself bound by its content.

This major disagreement was compounded by Barack Obama's poor relations with Benyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu's return to power shortly after the election of the Democratic leader meant that the American president quickly had to abandon his initial plan to promote a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The JCPoA was thus seen as a success for Barack Obama in the Middle East, designed to make up for his first failure. By withdrawing from the JCPoA and unleashing "the highest level of economic sanctions possible" against Iran, Donald Trump has, of course, restored US-Israeli relations, taking them to an all-time high, with the relocation of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (December 2017-January 2018), the expulsion of the PLO's diplomatic representation in Washington (October 2018), the recognition of the annexation of the Golan Heights (March 2019) or that of the legality of Israeli colonization in Palestine (November 2019).

The return of the Democrats to power in 2021, without systematically calling these decisions into question, has once again moderated the unbreakable alliance, notably by reopening negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue, in order to re-establish the JCPOA. However, there are other reasons for Israel's reluctance to support Ukraine and sanction Russia. Firstly, the Ukrainian conflict shakes Israeli society internally, firstly because Ukraine is one of the lands marked by the Shoah, and secondly because almost 20% of the Hebrew state's population is now Russian-speaking. Although the majority of these Russian-speaking Israelis seem to have sided with Ukraine, opinions remain divided, depending on Russian or Ukrainian family origins and political affiliations.

Secondly and more importantly, Israel's reserve towards the conflict has strategic reasons. Worried about the presence of Iran and Hezbollah on the side of Bashar al-Assad's regime, the Israeli army is in fact striking their forces engaged in the Syrian civil war. These strikes can only take place with the agreement of Russia, which controls Syrian airspace. They reveal the ambiguity of alliances in Syria, since theoretically Russians and Iranians support the same side. But this basic convergence does not prevent the occasional Russian-Israeli connivance, which the Israeli government considers a major factor in its security.

At the start of the conflict, Naftali Bennett, the Prime Minister tried to ward off bad luck by visiting Vladimir Putin in Moscow Vladimir Putin in Moscow, in order to set up a mediation. After this failed attempt, Israel condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine Ukraine in international forums and agreed to provide humanitarian aid to humanitarian aid to Ukraine, but refused to deliver arms to Kiev, despite despite President Zelensky's insistent and recurrent requests, thus placing itself the camp of Washington's allies, who have decided to go easy on Russia. Russia. This attitude has certainly not led the Israeli government to turn a blind eye to turn a blind eye to the anti-Semitic statements by Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, in May 2022. To Volodymyr Zelensky, who was astonished that Moscow could call the Ukrainian regime a "Nazi "Nazi", when its president himself has Jewish ancestry, the head of Russian diplomacy replied: "...this means absolutely nothing. absolutely nothing. For some time now, Jews themselves have been telling us that the greatest anti-Semites were Jews. This statement prompted a sharp reaction from Yair Lapid, Israel's Foreign Minister at the time. Lavrov's remarks "unforgivable and scandalous". outrageous". However, neither this diplomatic incident, nor the violence by the Russian army in the conflict led the Israeli government to change its position. to change its position.

In conclusion...

The cautious stance adopted by these three historic allies of the United States leads to a number of comments. Firstly, it would be wrong to think that, in this instance, this refusal to commit fully to the United States heralds an imminent break-up. For these countries, the American alliance remains a major security factor that cannot be replaced by connivance with Russia, or even China.

In secondly, it's likely that these infidelities have been fostered, since the turn of the millennium, by the fickleness of American foreign policy on the international stage. by the inconsistency of American foreign policy in the Middle East, which has been Middle East, which has been shaken by every election, with each new president questioning what his predecessor had done. To cope with such instability, the allies of American power are inclined to temper their loyalty by maintaining a tacit relationship with the opposing camp.

In lastly, the double role played by America's historic allies in the Middle East illustrates the new balances of the world to come. Much has been said about a new Cold War Cold War and a re-polarization of the world, with the emergence of an American-Chinese American-Chinese rivalry. While this hypothesis may have some relevance, it's not sure that it will usher in a new bipolarity. The contemporary world is multiple. The Middle East, Africa and even other regions of the world do not perceive the Ukrainian conflict as their own. As a result, the states of these regions are adjusting their loyalty to their structural alliances. In In this instance, they are denouncing the international disturbance aggression, without breaking off all relations with the aggressor. The American alliance is no longer seen as the only source of security. To be effective, it must be combined with a relationship of connivance with the with the opposing camp, so as not to sacrifice any part of their interests to a duty of unlimited loyalty.