Chérine CHAMS EL-DINE, Lecturer in Political Science and Deputy Coordinator of the French-language program at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science (FESP), Cairo University (Egypt).
On November 11, 2025, Iraq held its sixth parliamentary elections since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. A total of 7,745 candidates, divided among 31 coalitions and 38 political parties, as well as 75 independent candidates, competed for the 329 seats in Parliament for a four-year term. The Independent High Electoral Commission estimated the turnout at 56%, significantly higher than in the previous legislative elections in 2021, which was only 41%. However, the 2025 turnout rate only takes into account the 21 million voters who updated their biometric data, while the total number of Iraqis registered on the electoral roll is nearly 30 million, which would give an effective turnout rate of 40%. The exclusion of the 9 million people without biometric cards has therefore automatically inflated the official turnout rate(1). It should be noted that significant variations were observed between governorates. Those with a Sunni and Kurdish majority recorded relatively high turnout rates. On the other hand, turnout was comparatively low in the Shiite governorates in the south, as well as in Baghdad, with a rate of only 48.8% (2).
As in all recent Iraqi elections, no coalition has managed to secure a majority of the 329 parliamentary seats. The next government will therefore, once again, be the result of lengthy negotiations and dealings between political forces aimed at preserving the system of ethno-confessional distribution of posts (known as muhassassa), in use since 2005—the date of the Education first Iraqi government after the fall of the Baathist regime. This quota system, which is not enshrined in the 2005 Constitution, is nevertheless respected and complicates the appointment of the highest state officials following each Iraqi legislative election. The number of coalitions and the results of the 2025 elections(4) reflect not only intra-community fragmentation, but also shifts in the balance of power within each community.
Rebalancing and intra-community divisions
The Shiite bloc
The decision by Moqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist Movement, a Shiite political party that proclaims itself nationalist and opposed to any foreign interference, to boycott the elections had an impact on the low turnout in his electoral strongholds (Shiite-majority governorates in the south and the suburbs of Baghdad) and benefited certain Shiite political forces that are members of the Coordination Framework(5).
While former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's (2006-14) Rule of Law Alliance retained its relative influence by winning 29 seats, other political forces gained ground. This was the case for parties that suffered from tactical errors in 2021, notably the National State Forces Alliance of Ammar al-Hakim (leader of the al-Hikma Movement, or Wisdom) and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (2014-18). Known as moderate Shiite actors, their alliance made a notable comeback in the 2025 elections, winning 18 seats.
The balance between the two main factions close to the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU)(6), namely the al-Sadiqoun Alliance (the Faithful), led by Qais al-Khazali, head of the ‘Asa‘ib Ahl al-Haq militia, and the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Ameri, shifted during the 2025 elections. Both close to Iran, these actors used to run in previous elections under a common banner, such as the al-Fatah Alliance (the Conquest) in 2021 and the Nabni Alliance (Let's Build) in 2023. This year, however, they ran separately, and Khazali's group—Sadiqoun—won by a wide margin over Badr (27 seats to 18). This consolidates the position of Khazali, 51, as the leading figure of the Shiite movement aligned with the UMP, marking a generational shift and a symbolic change in leadership, breaking with the traditional dominance of Ameri, 71.
Finally, the Coalition for Reconstruction and Development led by outgoing Prime Minister Mohamed Chia al-Sudani came out on top with 46 seats. He focused his term on a policy of major projects aimed at improving public services and infrastructure. In addition, he is the first Iraqi prime minister not to have dual nationality and to have grown up and studied in Iraq, which has helped him gain popularity. Hoping to be reappointed as prime minister, he tried during his election campaign to capitalize on the relative stability Iraq has enjoyed during his term, thanks in particular to a policy of balance and good neighborliness that prioritizes Iraq's interests and national sovereignty, avoiding involvement in any regional conflicts. However, his political future is far from guaranteed; it is still too early to know whether the Shiite Coordination Framework—which formed the largest parliamentary bloc in 2025 and supported Soudani during his first term in October 2022—will once again back his candidacy for prime minister. The distribution of seats among the main parties comprising the Coordination Framework will determine the bargaining power each has when it comes to choosing the candidate for prime minister.
Sunni forces
Mohammed al-Halbousi, preparing his return to politics after his abrupt dismissal as Speaker of Parliament in 2023, appeared in person in Baghdad. His party, al-Taqadoum (Progress), achieved better results (27 seats) than its Sunni rivals, Muthanna al-Samarrai's al-Azim (Will) Alliance and businessman Khamis al-Khanjar's Sovereignty Alliance, which won 15 and 9 seats respectively. Al-Halbousi could thus run again for the presidency of Parliament, or even for the presidency of Iraq, a position for which he has already expressed interest and which has normally been reserved for Kurds since 2005. Although the presidency of the republic confers limited executive powers, it is of considerable symbolic importance and would allow Halbousi to establish himself as the undisputed leader of Iraq's Sunni Arabs. However, such ambitions on the part of al-Halbousi, and more broadly any attempt to reorganize the established ethno-sectarian order, would face strong resistance from other groups.
Kurdish parties
The two main parties in the Iraqi Kurdistan region maintained their relative influence and achieved the expected results. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Massoud Barzani, former President of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, won the most votes and secured 26 seats. It came out on top in the governorates of Erbil, Duhok, and Nineveh. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Bafel Talabani (son of Jalal Talabani, founder of the party and former President of Iraq), won 15 seats, coming out on top in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. However, a shift in the balance of power is evident among the smaller political forces. The New Generation Party, the third largest Kurdish party after the 2021 elections, saw its support collapse, falling from nine to just three seats. This decline can be explained in particular by the imprisonment of its leader, Shaswar Abdulwahid, who was arrested in August 2025. The Halwest party, founded in March 2024 and chaired by Kurdish politician Ali Hama Saleh, captured a large proportion of the seats left vacant by New Generation (both forces being fairly critical of the policies of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government), winning five seats.
A long process begins...
The 2025 legislative elections will certainly not lead to a change in the Iraqi political landscape; unsurprisingly, the results confirmed the dominance of the major traditional political forces. The electoral law, and in particular the method of seat allocation based on a modified version of the Sainte-Laguë method, adopted in 2023 to convert votes into seats, tends to penalize small lists and independents, thereby strengthening the influence of large coalitions. As a result, the secular political forces and those emerging from the popular mobilizations of Tishreen (October 2019), which formed the al-Badil (Alternative) Alliance, comprising 13 parties and led by Adnan al-Zourfi, former governor of Najaf, did not win any seats. These forces suffered from the new method of seat allocation, the boycott by a large proportion of secular and revolutionary voters, and their inability to compete with the well-established patronage networks of the traditional political forces.
Following the legislative elections, a lengthy process will begin to appoint senior state officials, in accordance with the ethno-confessional quota system in place since 2005. This will start with the election of the Speaker of Parliament, who is normally from the Sunni Arab community. This will be followed by the election of the president of the Republic, a position traditionally reserved for Kurds. Only after these appointments will the head of state entrust the task of forming a government to a Shiite prime minister from the majority parliamentary bloc. This final phase will require, on the one hand, a consensus among the Shiite forces of the Coordination Framework and, on the other hand, a tacit agreement between Washington and Tehran, both of which retain a say in the process of appointing the Iraqi prime minister. As the Iraqi novelist and poet Ahmed Saadawi so aptly described, "the struggle of the Iraqis has ended, and now begins that of the foreign powers."
References
1. Carole Massalsky, "Iraqi elections on November 11, 2025: political continuity and internal challenges amid growing international pressure," EISMENA, November 13, 2025, available at: https://eismena.com/article/elections-irakiennes-du-11-novembre-2025-continuite-politique-et-defis-internes-dans-un-contexte-de-pressions-internationales-croissantes-2025-11-13
2. Gulf States Newsletter, "PM Al-Sudani emerges as initial winner in Iraqi election," No. 1205, November 13, 2025.
3. According to which the Speaker of Parliament is a Sunni Arab, the President of the Republic is a Kurd, and the Prime Minister is a Shiite from the largest parliamentary bloc.
4. The complete results of the 2025 legislative elections are available in English at: https://iraqelection.channel8.com/english.
5. Coalition of the main Iraqi Shiite political forces formed following the 2021 legislative elections to break the political deadlock in the country, which led to the appointment of Mohammed Chia al-Soudani as Prime Minister after months of negotiations to form a government.
6. Formed in 2014, following the call of the senior Shiite cleric Ayatollah Sistani, to fight Islamic State militants and liberate Iraqi territory occupied by them.
7. Ali al-Mawlawi, “Deep Dive: How election results will offer early clues on Iraq’s next government,” Amwag, November 10, 2025, available at: Education.
8. He was Speaker of Parliament from 2018 to 2023, before being dismissed by decision of the Federal Supreme Court following a scandal involving forged signatures.
9. The results are available on the website of the Kurdistan Regional Government Representation in France (https://www.france.gov.krd/detail?ID=1169&Title=Fil News&Type=800#gsc.tab=0).
10. For more details on the popular uprisings in Tishreen, see: International Crisis Group, "Iraq's Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box," Middle East Report No. 223, July 2021, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iraq/223-iraqs-tishreen-uprising-barricades-ballot-box
11. Aljeebal, November 14, 2025, available at: https://aljeebal.com/posts/11163.