Jean Marcou, Professor of Law at Sciences Po Grenoble, researcher at CERDAP2 and associate researcher at the French Institute of Anatolian Studies in Istanbul.
On February 6, 2022, in a remote exchange, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called on his Russian counterpart to sign an armistice in Ukraine, open humanitarian corridors and seek a peace agreement. On February 24, 2022, Turkey had taken the view that "the operation launched by the armed forces of the Russian Federation against Ukraine" was "unacceptable". was "unacceptable" and, two days earlier, had already rejected Moscow's decision to recognize the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. The Turkish president interrupted the African tour he had just begun to return to Ankara, following the announcement of this recognition.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has adopted a measured strategy, combining firm rhetoric denouncing the denouncing Russian aggression as contrary to international law, and a more cautious a more cautious strategy in practice, which has seen it refuse to join the sanctions sanctions decided by Western countries. This nuanced reassured its allies, as the great discrepancy they had seen it make in recent years in recent years between its NATO membership and its special friendship with with Vladimir Putin in recent years, some of them feared it might be tempted tempted to switch sides.
In fact, the current crisis is a reminder that Russian and Turkish fundamentals remain antinomic in strategic terms. While the Turks do not wish to be drawn into this conflict, they fear their large northern neighbour their large northern neighbor, which once caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. He the war in Ukraine calls into question not only the great divide but also the triangular game Ankara had established with Moscow and Kiev Moscow and Kiev, the good relations between Presidents Erdoğan and Zelensky having also accentuated Turkish-Ukrainian rapprochement.
From the strategy of the great divide to the outline of a ménage à trois
We all remember the main events that marked the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey over the last decade. In addition to increasing their trade, the two countries sealed a genuine strategic convergence in the energy field, with Ankara agreeing to join the Russian gas pipeline project in the southern European corridor, dubbed Turkish Stream(opening in January 2020), and calling on Rosatom to build its first nuclear power plant. From 2016 onwards, after six months of a falling-out between the two neighbors, caused by the destruction by Turkish F-16s of a Russian fighter jet on the Turkish-Syrian border, Vladimir Putin constantly gave Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tokens of respect and friendship, particularly during the coup d'état that nearly toppled him that year. In 2017, Ankara entered, alongside Moscow and Tehran, the Astana negotiation process, aimed at promoting a settlement to the Syrian conflict, dispensing with the West and competing with the UN conference in Geneva.
Similar rapprochement processes were subsequently observed in Libya and in the Caucasus, during the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war. Meanwhile, the Turkish government, which for several years had been seeking to equip itself with air defense missiles, opted for the Russian S-400 system, even though such a weapon is not compatible with NATO protocols. With this decision, Turkey crossed a red line, which led the US Congress to exclude Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet production consortium, a retaliatory measure that is currently hampering the renewal of Turkey's combat air fleet.
A more detailed study to which we have contributed shows that this convergence has not been purely cyclical, and that it has been based on a genuine and constant effort to improve Russian-Turkish relations since the end of the Cold War. However, this rapprochement has not overcome a stubborn, not to say structural, mistrust. We recall that, historically, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was, among other things, the consequence of the defeats inflicted on it by Tsarist Russia in fourteen wars since the 16th century. More recently, in most of today's regional conflicts (Syria, Libya, the Caucasus), Ankara and Moscow are not on the same side.
What's more, since 2014, the Turkish government has never accepted Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea, proclaiming its attachment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, with which it has built a close relationship based on significant economic cooperation (steelworks, shipbuilding, furniture production, automotive supplies, agriculture...). In 2021, trade between the two countries reached over $7 billion. Following the signing of a defense agreement with Kiev in 2016, Turkey has also become a major supplier to the Ukrainian army, most recently supplying it with the Bayraktar TB2 combat drones that have previously distinguished themselves on the battlefields of Syria, Libya and the Caucasus. In January 2022, Ankara and Kiev even set up a joint venture to produce an improved version of these weapons.
The Turkish attempt to manage a compromised triangular situation
Even as the first Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014-2015, after the ceasefire and the Minsk agreements, bogged down, Turkey initially managed to make this antinomian triangular relationship flourish. Militarily invested in Syria and anxious to regain a role in the Middle East, Russia turned a blind eye to the Turkish-Ukrainian rapprochement all the more because it needed Ankara, which was at odds with its Western allies, particularly in the Syrian and Libyan theaters. Political, economic and military cooperation between Ankara and Kiev has steadily increased. Elected in 2019, Volodymyr Zelenski has significantly visited Turkey twice, while he in turn welcomed Recep Tayyip Erdoğan twice.
It should be remembered that the Zelensky presidency was initially marked by the hope of achieving peace with Russia in the Donbass, the new president having been elected on the promise of putting an end to a never-ending conflict in the east of the country. In 2019-2020, a number of goodwill gestures are thus being observed between Kiev and Moscow (release of prisoners, relaunch of discussions on the application of the Minsk agreements, meetings between leaders...). Turkey, which prides itself on its relationship with both Moscow and Kiev, believes it can strategically use its position to bring the two enemies closer together. All the more so as its occasional political convergences with Russia persist. In the spring of 2020, these were inconclusive in Libya, but in the autumn of the same year, they led to cooperation between Russian and Turkish forces to stabilize the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
From November 2021 onwards, the deployment of increasingly large Russian forces on Ukraine's borders, leading the United States to warn of the risk of invasion, did not discourage Ankara's efforts, which multiplied its contacts to offer mediation to Russia, NATO and Western leaders. In January 2022, the crushing of the revolt in Kazakhstan with the support of mainly Russian troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) should have alerted Ankara to the slim chances of success. Russia is determined to retain full control over what it considers its "near abroad". It showed this in Central Asia in January, and will show it in Europe in February.
Yet the main objective that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan assigned to his trip to Ukraine on February 3, 2022 was the de-escalation of tensions, and conciliation between Moscow and Kiev. During this visit, while celebrating the good health of Turkish-Ukrainian relations, Erdoğan even takes a swipe at Western leaders, particularly the Europeans, criticizing them for not being active enough in the search for a compromise, and even for throwing oil on the fire. Apparently unconvinced by Emmanuel Macron's initiatives, he explains in particular that, following Angela Merkel's departure, there is a leadership problem in Europe. This observation seems to justify his own intervention, leading him to announce the probable holding of a Putin-Zelensky summit in Turkey. Of course, this scenario will not take place, but Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will defend it to the bitter end, notably in a telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart on the eve of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We note that the Turkish president mentioned it again during his conversation with Vladimir Putin on March 6, 2022.
The firm but cautious condemnation of Turkey's invasion of Ukraine
Ever since the Russian invasion of Ukraine invasion of Ukraine, Turkey's position seems to be dominated by two contradictory concerns: the need to firmly condemn Russia's behavior, and the concern behavior, and the desire to stay out of a conflict for which it could bear the brunt. costs.
In a series of official press releases, the Turkish authorities condemned the aggression against Ukraine in no uncertain terms. On February 25, 2022, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan even criticized the West for its lukewarm attitude, stating that NATO should have taken more decisive action, that the Europeans lacked determination in their approach and were confining themselves to advising Ukraine without taking action. Yet Turkey did not join the sanctions against Moscow. At the Council of Europe, it refused to support the suspension of Russia. Nor has it agreed to close its airspace to Russian aircraft, as most European countries have done. Finally, with regard to the passage of warships through the straits, particularly Russian warships, which Ukraine asked it to block on February 24, it has deferred to the Montreux Convention of 1936 , which it intends to apply scrupulously.
In the current situation (a war in which Turkey is not involved, but in which neighboring countries are taking part), Article 19 of this text stipulates that the free movement of warships from countries not involved in the conflict remains in place, but that warships from involved countries (such as Russia and Ukraine) can no longer travel except to their home ports in the Black Sea. Speaking on CNN Türk, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavusoglu said that Russia's military operation in Ukraine should be considered a war, and that Article 19 of the Montreux Convention would therefore apply, preventing Russian warships from crossing the straits except to return to their bases.
While it's understandable that, as guardian of the straits as guardian of the Straits, Turkey wishes to abide by the convention governing governing the Straits, it may also be thought that it risks marginalizing itself by sanctions against Russia, especially if the measures taken by the European European Union (EU) intensify and prove effective. And yet, it seems that Ankara has decided to stick to this cautious and somewhat position. On March 2, 2022, the spokesman for the Turkish Presidency, Ibrahim Kalin, confirmed the position position adopted from the outset, We are not in favor of imposing sanctions on Russia. Russia. We have commercial ties in gas, tourism and agriculture. We don't want to take an initiative that would damage our country". He also reiterated that Ankara had not lost hope Ankara had not given up hope of playing a role in mediation. who will talk to Russia when everyone else has cut off ties? cut off?". The Turkish presidential spokesman Russian demands for a ceasefire, including Ukraine's disarmament and its acceptance of Moscow's annexation of annexation of Crimea, were "unrealistic" and "unacceptable". "unacceptable".
To stay away from a summit confrontation?
In any case, the consequences consequences of the Ukrainian crisis are likely to be significant for a country unprecedented economic crisis. Indeed, we can expect the war in Ukraine impact on tourism. Russians are the number one tourist tourist population in Turkey, which has also become the leading destination for Ukrainians, nearly a million of whom visited in in 2021. Turkey is also concerned about the possible gas consequences (even though it has diversified its supplies in recent years) or agricultural (it is a major grain customer of both belligerents) of the conflict. of the conflict. We can nevertheless assume that it will be able to face up to these challenges and that remains its position in the crisis, as this is likely to determine the place will determine its place in the new global equilibrium that will be that will be established at the end of the crisis.
For many of Turkey's contemporary ruling elites, beyond Ukraine, the real issue at stake in this war is the redefinition of relations between Russians and Westerners. Hence Turkey's tendency to distance itself from this power struggle, calling for respect for international law and mediation. In many respects, this stance is reminiscent of the neutralist line taken by the first republican Turkey, which led it not to get involved in the Second World War in the first place, and to enter the war against the Axis countries only in February 1945. In this instance, the Turkish government also points out that the EU has not asked it to join the sanctions policy being pursued, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, while welcoming this, expressed surprise at the EU's eagerness to take an interest in the Ukrainian application, regretting moreover that Brussels had not given the same welcome to his country's application. "I say to the EU member states, please show the same attention to Turkey's application as you did to Ukraine's. Or are you not going to give the same attention to Turkey's application as you did to Ukraine's? Or are you only going to put Turkey on the agenda when someone declares war on it and attacks it?" reacted the Turkish president.
In any case, for the time being, Ankara claims above all to be implementing the decisions of NATO, which, as we know, has decided not to get involved in the conflict. The Turkish government is not discouraging, however, the strong solidarity movement that is currently manifesting itself in support of Ukraine, both in the form of demonstrations and the consequent commitment of the country's humanitarian organizations(notablythe Turkish Red Crescent). Against a backdrop of growing strategic polarization, however, it is not certain that this new version of the strategy of the great divide will prove sustainable.