Kari De Pryck, assistant professor at the University of Geneva.
Visiting professor at Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA
Kari De Pryck is a lecturer at the Institute of Environmental Sciences. Before joining the University of Geneva, she was affiliated with the University of Cambridge (2019-2021), the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) in Potsdam (2021) and Université Grenoble Alpes (2022). She works on global climate governance and in particular on the role of scientific expertise in international negotiations.
* This blog post is based on the author's notes from COP29. It is part of a book on the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement, co-written with Géraldine Pflieger, professor at the University of Geneva.
The 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in the Azerbaijani capital of Baku in November 2024, was marked by intense tensions both inside and outside the event. It allows us to think of international climate negotiations as a "mesocosm". A mesocosm is a medium-sized experimental device in which the natural living conditions of species can be reproduced and controlled according to various physical or chemical parameters, particularly in oceanography, ecotoxicology and the study of ecosystem dynamics. While it can be used to simulate fairly realistic environmental conditions, it nevertheless remains a simplified and imperfect representation of "nature", which is far more complex in reality. The mesocosm is also, in itself, an ecosystem, and can develop certain properties of its own.
The allegory of the mesocosm offers an interesting way of thinking about the relationship between the "macro" and the "micro" of international climate negotiations. The COPs function as a mesocosm, a tool designed to simplify the elaboration of a global climate strategy by attempting to reflect the complexity of interactions between states and transnational actors. The mesocosm can seem like a bubble, a miniaturized world, sometimes caricature-like, reflecting the multiple interests and beliefs that shape relations between societies and states more broadly. COPs can therefore rarely escape "external" (geophysical and geopolitical) configurations. However, they do more than reflect the world around them. By virtue of their spatial and temporal anchorage, they lead over time to the (re)production of singular rules and practices. They have become a small world with its own codes, themes, standards, temporalities, spaces and decision-making practices.
In this blog post, I propose to return to the COP29 mesocosm and the tensions between the "macro" - global geopolitics and geophysics - and the "micro" of international climate negotiations.
Geopolitical and geophysical context
Several geopolitical events are reflected in the COP, including the war in Ukraine, the re-election of Donald Trump and trade competition between the major powers. First of all, the choice of host country, which fell to the Eastern European states, took place against a backdrop of war in Ukraine, with Russia refusing to support a bid from the EU's Eastern member states. The final decision was taken by Azerbaijan and Armenia, two countries involved in a border dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter eventually agreed to withdraw its veto in exchange for the release of Armenian prisoners (Chandrasekhar et al., 2024). During the COP, the geopolitical context remained particularly tense, marked by the stalemate in the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the rise of populist and far-right ideas, and the spectre of inflation taking hold in many countries.
These events were compounded by Donald Trump's re-election to the White House a week before the COP, rekindling fears of a further US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, or even the UNFCCC. Inside the COP, participants oscillate between denial and hope. For some, nothing can stop the climate transition. John Podesta, senior advisor to the President of the United States on international climate policy, declared at the COP that the fight against climate change "goes far beyond one election, one political cycle, in one country." (field notebook). For others, the re-election of a climate sceptic as head of one of the world's major powers sends out the wrong signal, at a time when many countries are facing growing mistrust of climate policies. It seems that Argentine President Javier Milei's decision to summon the country's delegation to leave the COP a few days after its opening was justified by his desire to get closer to the President-elect.
Finally, the "fierce" economic competition between the major powers also disrupted the conference (Criqui, Damian and Rousset, 2024). Negotiations began a day late, as states were unable to agree on the COP agenda. At the heart of the debate is the request by the BASIC group, led by China, to put on the agenda the issue of unilateral trade-restrictive measures adopted under the pretext of climate objectives-a request already made at COP28. This request is aimed at "developed" countries, and in particular the EU, which in 2023 introduced a border carbon adjustment mechanism (BCAM) aimed at taxing imported products according to their carbon footprint.
Added to this tense geopolitical context is a year marked by the impact of global warming. COP29 opens with the publication by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) of its report on the state of the climate in 2024, which establishes itself as the hottest year in the last decade, surpassing all previous years. In addition to this record, a series of extreme and often deadly events hit the four corners of the globe, including floods in Spain, Pakistan and Nepal, and fires in Canada.
The COP agenda and internal dynamics
COP29 is also following its own agenda, with the central issue at stake being the completion of negotiations on climate financing - a subject that crystallizes many tensions between so-called "developed" and "developing" countries - a categorization that may be obsolete, but continues to structure deliberations within the COPs. COP29 is to be the "COP of finance", the meeting that will deliver a new financial target to replace the $100 billion target set in 2009. The expectations of representatives from "developing" countries are very high. Tensions have been palpable for several years, with "developed" countries remaining evasive about the amount they are prepared to commit. The organization of the COP is also taking place under tension, in a context where the host country is seeking to exert greater control over the running of the event, in particular over the mobilization of civil society. The COP presidency, which plays the role of orchestrator of the negotiations, is also the subject of fierce criticism.
The organization of the COP is tightly controlled by the Azerbaijani authorities. They are suspected of having arrested dozens of activists and journalists in the run-up to the event. The city has been cleaned from top to bottom, and car traffic has been reduced to allow the shuttles carrying the many participants to move quickly. Police are patrolling the city and controlling access to the site. Civil society mobilizations take place exclusively in the blue zone. Unable to obtain authorization to organize the traditional climate march, civil society decided to march in silence.
Numerous scandals also marred the COP presidency, right from its appointment in January 2024. The President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, appointed Mukhtar Babayev, Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, to chair the event. Babayev worked for the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan for over twenty years. Aliyev makes no secret of his enthusiasm for fossil fuels, declaring that oil and gas are a "gift from God". The credibility of the presidency was also put to the test during the conference. It wants to emulate the success of the UAE presidency, which succeeded in getting the loss and damage fund adopted at the opening of COP28. Babayev and his team succeeded in getting the carbon market rules adopted, but not without criticism from environmental NGOs, who denounced the weakness of the new framework and the absence of clear environmental guarantees. The role of the Presidency during the negotiations was strongly criticized. Its proposed decisions, particularly on climate finance, are irritating, as it struggles to propose compromises. It is also accused of allowing Saudi Arabian negotiators to directly modify draft texts, which is not normally accepted.
Disappointing results
COP29 delivered a new quantified collective target. The decision sets a new target of at least $300 billion in financing per year by 2035 for "developing" countries. While "developed" countries are expected to take the initiative and assume major responsibility for these efforts, "developing" countries are called upon to contribute on a voluntary basis.
The process by which the decision is taken is strongly criticized, not least for its lack of transparency. While the "developing" countries, and in particular India, the Arab group and the African group, had estimated their needs at at least 1,300 billion dollars, the "developed" countries had provided no information in advance of the COP on the amount they were prepared to pay. The second week's proposal to mobilize $250 billion by 2035 was rejected. Seeking to appease the anger of the "developing" countries, the "developed" countries agreed to increase their contribution by $50 billion. They also agreed to add the qualifier "at least" 300 billion and to assess progress in climate finance by 2030 (Bittle, 2024).
These last-minute concessions did not convince all countries. At the COP closing ceremony, several countries, including India, Bolivia and Niger, opposed the adoption of the decision. For the spokesman of the Africa group, the promised funding is "too little, too late and too ambiguous." (ENB, 2024). For the Indian representative, this decision, which should have demonstrated a common will to make progress, "does not reflect, convey or inspire the confidence necessary to believe that we will succeed in overcoming the serious challenge of climate change." For the EU, on the contrary, the agreement is "exceptional", "ambitious" and "realistic" given the geopolitical context (field notes).
Many experts agree that the current geopolitical situation, combined with the spectre of austerity in many "developed" countries - the main debtors of climate financing - weighed particularly heavily on COP29. For sociologist Stefan Aykut (in Garric, 2024), "the weakness of the new climate financing target is undoubtedly also linked to the fact that the United States will not be contributing to it for the next four years". The inexperience of the Azerbaijani presidency is also blamed for the weakness of the decision (Chandrasekhar et al., 2024). Babayev (2024), for his part, blames the "developed" countries.
Against this backdrop, all eyes are on COP30, which will be held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025 and is set to breathe new life into international climate cooperation. The task, however, falls mainly to the states, which must submit their new NDCs in the course of 2025. It will be interesting to revisit the question of the conjunctures between the "macro" and "micro" of the negotiations, and to observe whether they manage to revive hope in the UNFCCC's ability to set a course.
Babayev, M. (2024). I'm glad we got a deal at Cop29 - but western nations stood in the way of a much better one, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/nov/25/cop-29-western-nations-global-south-brazil
Bittle, J. (2024). 'We lost': How COP29 ended with a deal that made the whole world unhappy. Grist. https://grist.org/international/cop29-agreement-baku-new-collective-quantified-goal/
Chandrasekhar, A., D. Dunne, O. Dwyer, S. Evans, J. Gabbatiss, M. Lempriere, W. Song, A. Tandon and G. Viglione (2024). COP29: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Baku. Carbon Brief. https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop29-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-baku/
Criqui, P., Damian, M., and Rousset, N. (2024). Le climat, c'est aussi de l'économie, avec une compétition acharnée entre la Chine, les États-Unis et l'Union européenne, Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2024/11/13/le-climat-c-est-aussi-de-l-economie-avec-une-competition-acharnee-entre-la-chine-les-etats-unis-et-l-union-europeenne_6390999_3232.html
ENB (2024). Summary of the 2024 Baku Climate Change Conference: 11-22 November 2024, IISD 12(865). https://enb.iisd.org/baku-un-climate-change-conference-cop29-summary
Garric, A. (2024). Les COP font partie des barrages contre la tempête populiste qui déferle sur la planète, Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2024/11/25/les-cop-font-partie-des-barrages-contre-la-tempete-populiste-qui-deferle-sur-la-planete_6412801_3244.html