by Merve Özkaya, doctoral student in political science, Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA
Photo: Demonstration organized by the CHP of Lyon, following the arrest of the mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, Place de la Comédie (Lyon), March 22, 2025. Photo : Merve Özkaya.
The Turkish diaspora1 in Europe, though plural, is mainly identified, politically, through its conservative, nationalist and pro-Erdoğan segment. This segment is structured around cultural associations and other civil society organizations, such as Cojep International, the Union of International Democrats (UID, it operates as a branch of the AKP in Europe), among others. In recent years, however, another Turkish political current has been gaining in visibility within this same diaspora: the Republican People's Party (CHP), a secular, Kemalist Education party with social-democratic components, and a member of the Socialist International. Buoyed by its electoral successes in the 2019 and 2023 municipal elections in Turkey, the CHP has considerably increased its popularity in the country. It is now seen as the main political force likely to succeed the AKP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, unless free and fair elections are called into question in the country. Indeed, from the 2010s onwards, the CHP embarked on a restructuring process marked in particular by the rejuvenation of its cadres and the liberalization of its ideological-political line2. As part of this dynamic, it has also been organizing within the Turkish diaspora, particularly in Western Europe, for the past decade.
More recently, demonstrations organized by CHP sections abroad (CHP Yurtdışı Birliği) in numerous European cities (Paris, Lyon, Strasbourg, Berlin, Brussels, Amsterdam, Vienna, London, Milan, etc.), following the arrest of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu last March, as well as the primary election to designate the CHP candidate for Turkey's presidential election, held on March 23, testify to the relatively recent rise of this renewed political force in the Turkish diasporic space.
In this context, we need to examine how the CHP is organized in the diaspora, and the impact of its presence in the Turkish diaspora in France. To do so, we will analyze the organizational dynamics of this party abroad (logics of actors and power, pathways of commitment of its members), as well as its political strategy (objectives, actions, interactions with other political formations). This analysis is based in particular on participant observations made as part of our doctoral fieldwork, conducted among Turkish populations in the Lyon region between 2020 and 2025.
Organizational dynamics
The creation of CHP diaspora branches came on the eve of Turkey's 2014 presidential election, the first in which the President of the Republic was elected by direct universal suffrage, and also the first in which Turkish citizens living abroad were able to vote remotely in a national ballot. Aware of the political role that the diaspora vote could play, the CHP approached Turkish notables close to the party, established abroad, and asked them to open local branches in their countries of residence.
CHP organizations in France, as elsewhere, were officially set up as associations in Paris in 2014, in Lyon, Bordeaux, Strasbourg and Marseille in 2015, in Nantes in 2017 and in Metz in 2022, i.e. cities characterized by a large Turkish population. The profile of the party's members can be divided into three broad categories: on the one hand, nationalists, who are more sovereignist republicans than true democrats; on the other, Alevis3 who identify with social democracy; and finally, a younger generation, with a liberal-democratic sensibility and a left-wing orientation. Secularism is a common denominator for all three groups, although its meaning and stakes may differ from one profile to another.
Another significant aspect concerns the balance and co-presence of the sexes, both within the membership profile and in the party's governing bodies. Unlike the majority of Turkish associative organizations in France (with the notable exception of Alevi4 associations, generally close to the CHP), where women are often relegated to the "women's branches", this party stands out for a more transversal and egalitarian integration of women throughout its structures.
These organizations, which receive no financial support from CHP headquarters, are mostly founded by wealthy Turkish entrepreneurs. This lack of institutional resources for their financing gives rise to several organizational problems: discontinuity of activities (it is difficult to finance a permanent premises or even to organize activities solely with membership fees, some leaders have given up their missions due to the weight of the personal investment required, etc.) and financial dependence on the local president of the association, contributing, in some cases, to the establishment of a vertical hierarchy in internal decision-making processes. Added to this are long-standing and informal relationships between certain members, which can call into question the objectivity and democratic nature of these processes.
Despite a sometimes cumbersome and dysfunctional hierarchical structure, the CHP's youth branches in France, particularly in Lyon, have in recent years contributed to a significant revitalization of the organization. The profile of young people involved in the party is largely characterized by a graduate, progressive and highly politicized population. They include, on the one hand, young people who have recently arrived in France from Turkey for economic, political or educational reasons, and, on the other, descendants of Turkish immigrants, most of them secularized, who no longer recognize themselves in conservative diaspora circles. In addition to their militant activities (such as demonstrations linked to current events in Turkey or party propaganda during election periods), they generally organize events to mark Turkish national holidays, usually in a fun and friendly atmosphere, as well as informal gatherings (for example, evenings to welcome young people who have recently arrived in France). As a result, for these young people, the CHP appears not only as a space for socialization and political expression, but also as a network of solidarity.
It's also worth noting that the dynamism of the party's youth could also help redefine the party's image among a conservative section of the diaspora (notably its youth), still largely marked by a vision of the party inherited from the past, perceived as elitist, technocratic and far removed from the traditional values dominant in these circles. Having grown up under the AKP, most of these young people have politicized themselves in opposition to the authoritarianism of Erdoğan's regime, and defend liberal and democratic ideas, while demonstrating openness to others.
What political strategies?
There's no doubt that the CHP's presence in France is part and parcel of the party's electoral strategy, aimed at consolidating and organizing its diaspora electorate during election periods in Turkey. Even if its electoral weight remains limited in France, the CHP is one of the two Turkish political parties, along with the far-right MHP, to have increased its number of votes in France between the last two legislative elections (from 8.93% in 2018 to 12.71% in 2023). However, it remains legitimate to question exactly how much of this increase is actually attributable to the party's organization on French territory.
During election periods, the CHP, along with other political parties, notably the pro-Kurdish HDP (DEM Party), also assumes the role of guaranteeing the smooth running of voting in the diaspora. In Lyon, for example, the party sends representatives to the polling stations, in this case on the premises of the DITIB (Turkish mosque and cultural center), to ensure the security of the ballot boxes. These representatives are also tasked with reporting any breaches of electoral legislation, such as the violation of electoral silence at polling stations or cases of non-secret voting.
So, in a context where the conservative, pro-government segment of the Turkish diaspora in France (with around 67% of the vote in France and over 86% in Lyon in favor of Erdoğan in 2023) is in the majority and far better organized in terms of material and human resources, the CHP's presence in the diasporic political field assumes symbolic importance, constituting a counter-power, or even a "counter-diaspora" in opposition to the "diaspora loyal" to the government. All the more so as Turkey's diplomatic representations tend to be more open and closer to the conservative wing of the diaspora. For example, on October 29, 2023, no diplomatic representative of the consulate honored the invitation of the CHP of Lyon to the event organized on its premises to mark the centenary of the Republic. On the other hand, a simple consultation of the Instagram page of the Turkish Consulate in Lyon reveals the regular participation of the consular corps in events organized by associations such as DITIB, the Islamic Confederation of Milli Görüş or UID, notably on the occasion of kermesses, fast-breaking meals, etc.
That said, it should be remembered that Turkish nationalism, with its sovereignist orientation, is a structuring element of the CHP's political identity. It is therefore not surprising that, on certain sensitive issues, such as the Armenian genocide, the CHP in France adopts positions close to those of the conservative, nationalist wing of the Turkish diaspora. Although this issue is the subject of internal debate within the party, there is evidence that, in Lyon in 2012, some CHP members and officials took part in demonstrations organized against the bill to criminalize the denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide, as recognized by the French state
As far as participation in French politics is concerned, the CHP shares ideological affinities with left-wing parties, notably the Socialist Party5. Moreover, to our knowledge, during the 2020 municipal elections in the Lyon region, some binational members affiliated to the CHP were included on various left-wing lists. However, unable to mobilize the entire Franco-Turkish electorate, which is predominantly conservative, these candidates are not the first choice of French parties adopting a clientelist electoral strategy. Indeed, the latter tend to favor Franco-Turkish personalities from Turkish religious associative circles (such as DITIB or Milli Görüş), deemed more likely to rally a significant number of votes.
In short, driven by a new generation of qualified, secular activists committed to democratic values (a generation strengthened by recent waves of migration from Turkey), the CHP's presence in the Turkish diaspora in France is redefining the dividing lines within this diaspora. Its future evolution, as well as its impact on the French and Turkish political scenes, merits continued attention, particularly in the context of the democratic challenges facing Turkey and European societies to varying degrees.
1 We use the term "diaspora" in the emic sense
2 For a recent analysis of the evolution of the CHP in Turkey, see : Aurélien Denizeau, "La renaissance du Parti républicain du peuple (CHP). Phoenix ou chimère?", Ifri Studies, Ifri, September 2024. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/2024-09/la_renaissance_du_parti_republicain_du_peuple_chp._phoenix_ou_chimere.pdf
3 Alevism is a heterodox branch of popular Islam, often presented as close to Shi'ism. It is estimated that there are over 100,000 Alevis in France, out of a diasporic population estimated at between 700,000 and 1,000,000. Ali Yaman and Rasim Özgür Dönmez, "Creating cohesion from diversity through mobilization: locating the place of alevi federations in alevi collective identity in europe", Türk Kültürü ve Hacı Bektaş Veli Araştırma Dergisi, 77, March 2016, 13-36, p. 18.
4 Alevi associations in France (Centre culturel Alévi, Alevi Kültür Merkezi in Turkish) operate under the aegis of the Fédération de l'Union des Alévis de France (FUAF), created in 1997.
5 Like the CHP, the Socialist Party is a member of the Socialist International.